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Information Structure in Discourse: 
Towards an Integrated Formal Theory of Pragmatics' 
Craige Roberts 
For many linguists interested in pragmatics, including the Prague School theorists, 
Halliday (1967), and Vallduvf (1992,1993), information structure is a sentence-level 
structure. It is generally characterized as a variation of sentential structure along certain 
parameters to modulate the presentation of the information imparted by the sentence in 
such a way as to relate that information to prior context. The factors in that relationship 
are characterized· in terms of primitive functional roles such as theme/rheme, 
focus/(back)ground, topic/link, old/new, etc. These primitives and the correlated 
information structure of sentences are used to explain the roles of intonational focus and 
of particular syntactic focus constructions, of topicalization and other displacement 
transformations, and of a fairly wide range of other phenomena, including, e.g., word 
order in relatively free word order languages such as German, the functions of 
distinguished structural positions in Catalan or Hungarian, definiteness in Slavic 
languages, specificity in Turkish, use of specific affixes such as Japanese -wa, etc. 
Most researchers who work on focus, topic, etc., talk about their relationship· to felicity, 
and hence to the context of utterance. But few look beyond the sentence to examine in 
any detail the range of kinds of contexts in which an utterance with a given focus is 
actually felicitous. 2 Kadmon & Roberts ( 1986) argued that this methodology was crucial 
to understanding the role of focus in interpretation. They claimed that at its most 
abstract, this role is tha_t of constraining (via conventional presuppositions) what they 
called the information structure of contexts in which the utterance would be felicitous. 
This perspective on information structure stems ultimately from the work of Carlson 
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Interpretation, especially Louise McNally, and also Mike Calcagno, Peter Culicover, David Dowty, 
Andreas Kathol, and Svetlana Vasina, for their comments and penetrating questions on earlier versions of 
this material. Thanks also to Paul Portner and to Nirit Kadmon for valuab]e comments on an earlier draft. 
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where I presented an abbreviated version. I owe a considerable debt to Nirit Kadmon, with whom I 
explored many of the issues discussed here over several years, and to Stanley Peters and CSL!, Stanford 
University, who supported some of our work together. None of these people, however, should be assumed• 
to agree with the proposal I offer here. 
2Prince and her students are generally exceptions to this criticism. 
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( 1983), though he himself realized it with a text grammar.J The conception I will 
develop here is one in which information structure is literally a structure on information ­
- on the inquiry pursued in discourse and the information which that inquiry yields, and 
not on the utternnces or sequences of utterances used to present it. All that is given at the 
sentential level, conventionally, are certain sorts of presuppositions about the place and 
function of the utterance in the information strncture of the discourse in which it occurs. 
I first define, in §I, the intended notion of the information struct11re of a discourse in an 
extension of Stalnaker's (possible worlds) view of context, an extension which takes into 
account questions as well as assertions and imposes a pragmatically-motivated structure 
on well-formed exchanges. Then in §2, to illustrate how this structure provides an 
account for the types of phenomena classically pursued in theories of information 
structure, I will outline a theory of a phenomenon very directly related to information 
structure -- the conventional impllcatures associated with prosodic focus in English 
utterances, and suggest how this account improves on others currently in the literature. 
I will assume that information str~cture is a universal of human discourse, not dependent 
on the specific syntactic structures or other conventions which are developed in a given 
language to fulfill the associated functions. But the account of the meanings associated 
with prosodic focus in English is very language-specific; we might expect that other 
languages would use very different means to achieve some of the same ends, or would 
use similar means to encode other kinds of information. The point of combining the two 
accounts in one discussion is to use the second to illustrate how the first enters into the 
interpretation of particular utterances in particular languages. But I think that one of the 
virtues of.the type of information structure I have in mind is that it has much broader 
implications for formal pragmatic theory, providing a unified foundation for accounts of 
phenomena otherwise considered to be quite diverse and independent of each other. In 
§3, I will very briefly note. what I take some of its other potential applications to be, and 
the relationship of this proposal to a number of others in artificial intelligence, linguistics, 
and philosophy, 
§1. Information Structure and Questions in a Language Game 
Discourse is organized around a series of conversational goals and the plans, or 
strategies, which .conversational participants develop to achieve them. This should not be 
surprising, given the central role granted to intentions in communication and meaning, 
e.g. by. Grice ( l 989), Lew.is (1969), Grosz & Sidner ( 1986), Planning Theorists in 
artificial intelligence, Sperber & Wilson ( 1986), and Thomason ( 1990); but an integrated 
theory of this intentional structure and its ramifications for pragmatic theory has not, to 
my knowledge, been developed previously. 
Following Stalnaker ( 1979), I assume that the primary goal of disc~urse is communal 
inquiry -- the attempt to discover and share with the other interlocutors "the way things 
are", i.e. to share information about our world. But we must develop strategies for 
achieving this goal, and these strategies involve sub-inquiries. As in a game, some 
strategies may be better, some worse; this is largely a matter of the rationality of the 
participants, and not of linguistic competence per se. Whether strategies are effective 
involves, as well, an element of luck, as in any inquiry. To understand better what I have 
in mind, let us pursue the analogy with games.4 
··
1After the ideas related here were worked out, I received a copy ot' Ginzburg (1994b), who nlso follows 
Carlson and proposes something related to the conception of information sLructure i·eluted here, Lhough he 
doesn't call it such and takes very different turns at a number of points. His intended application seems to 
be more narrowly to characterize well-formed exchanges in discourse. 
4Jn this, I follow Carlson (1983), though I have developed the idea somewhnt differently here. Of course, 
ultimately the comparison of discourse to a game goes bnck to \Vittgenstein, and has been pil:ked up by 
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The principal elements of a game are its goal(s), the rules which players abide by, the 
moves they may make towards achieving the goals, and the strategies they may pursue in 
making their moves, the last generally constrained by the first three and,-above all; by 
rational considerations. W.e take the aims or goals of a language game, as already noted, 
to be to come to agree on the way things are in the world. Using Stalnaker's (1979) 
notion of the common ground (the set of propositions which the interlocutors in a 
discourse behave as-if they all hold to be true, with a proposition realized technically as a 
set of possible worlds) and related context set (the intersection of the cominon ground, 
the set of worlds where all the propositions in the common ground are true}, our goal is 'to 
reduce the context set to a singleton set, the actual world. There are two types of rules, 
both viewed as constrai_nts on the interlocutors' lingui_stic behavior: conventional rules 
(syntactic, compositional seman_tic, etc.), and conversational rules (e.g.,_ the Gricean 
maxim_s). The latter are not properly linguistic, but are given by rational considerations 
in view of the goal of the game (e.g., the Maxim of Cooperation follows from the fact 
that playing the language game is a coordination problem, ala Lewis; Quality from the 
fact that truth is the ultimate goal; Quantity I from the desire to maximize the payoff of a 
move in v~ew of commitment to the ultimate goal), and of human _cognitive limi~ations 
(cf. Sper_ber & Wilson's (1986) discussion of Relevance and Quantity·2 iii this light).S 
There are two types of moves which players may make, linguistic behaviors which fall 
under the kinds of acceptabl\l behavior defined by the rules and are classified <in the basis 
of their relationship to the goals of the game (I ignore here the general class of 
imperatives):. what Carlson cails set-up. moves, which a,re questions, and what he calls 
payoff moves, which are assertions, the answers io questions. Note that moves, on the 
interpretation I will give them, are not speech acts, but the semantic objects which are 
used in -speech acts: A speech act is the act of proferring a move. I will return to discuss 
strategies of inquiry just below. 
I assume that there are two aspects to· the interpretation of any given move: its 
presupposed content and its proffered content. l use the· term proffered as a cover for 
what is asserted in an assertion and for the non-presupposed content of questions and 
commands. Lewis (1969) treats questions as a type of imperative; this strikes me as 
correct in that a question, if accepted, dictates that the interlocutors choose among the 
alternatives which it proffers.6 Most contemporary semantic analyses·regard a question 
as _denoting or determining the set of propositions which are the possible answers (or 
correct answers, in some theories) to the question; these are the proffered alternatives. If 
a question is accepted by tlie interlocutors, this commits them to a common goal, finding 
the answer; like the commitment to a goal in Planning Theory, this is aparticularly strong 
type of commitment, one which persists until the goal is satisfied or is shown to be 
unsatisfiable. The accepted question becomes the immediate topic: of discussion, which I 
will also call the immediate question under·discussion, often abbreviated as the 
question under discussion. 
Note that Stalnaker's goal of discourse can itself be viewed as a question, the Big 
Question, What is the way things are?, whose corresponding set of alternatives is the set 
of all singleton sets of worlds in the context set at a given point in discourse. -This 
suggests another way of viewing the set of alternatives proffered by a question: a 
question sets up a partition on the context set at the point of utterance, each cell the set of 
worlds in which one complete answer to the question is true (cf. -the use of partitions to 
characterize -answer-sets in Groenendijk & Stokhof ( 1984)): Then we can view the 
others, including Lewis (1969) and, of course, Carlson's mentor Hintikka ( 1973, 1979, 1981 ). 
5Here and below, I capitalize the Gricean notion of Relevance, and the related notion which I will formally 
define below, to distinguish them from the ordinary English term. 
6There are also reasons one might w_ant to treat questions and imperatives as distinct types of speech acts. 
Since I'm not addressing imperatives here. I won't try to argue one way or the other. 
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context set itself as representing the ultimate set of alternatives, for it is the selection of a 
unique ("actual") world which is our ultimate goal. 
When interlocutors accept a question, they form an intention to answer it, which intention 
is entered into the common ground. 7 If a cooperative interlocutor knows of this intention, 
she is committed to it, i.e. she herself (ostensibly) has an intention to answer the question. 
Then Relevance, an organizing principle of discourse which supports coherence and 
hence facilitates the processing and storage of information, will. lead her to attempt to 
answer it as soon as possible after it is asked. Grice's Quantity I maxim, in view of the 
goals of discourse, makes a complete answer preferable to a partial one. 
Assertions are, as for Stalnaker, choices among alternatives. If accepted, they are added 
to the common ground and thereby shrink the context set. In order for discourse to be 
coherent (obey Relevance), it must be clear what alternatives (corresponding to cells in a 
partition on the context set) a given assertion selects among. The relevant alternatives are 
those proffered by the question, or topic, under discussion. That's the sense in which 
assertions are payoff moves -- they choose among the alternatives proffered by a set-up 
move/question, and in so doing they further the goals of the game. Non-sequiturs are 
assertions which don't bear on the question under discussion; even though informative in 
the abstract, they reflect poor strategy and a lack of commitment to the immediate goals 
of the discourse, i.e. a lack of cooperation. Non~sequiturs also fail to maximize pay-off; 
good strategists make assertions with a view to optimizing the number of relevant 
inferences that they will trigger, and it seems reasonable to assume that such inferences 
are facilitated by the discourse segmentation induced by the plan structure of the 
discourse (see Grosz & Sidner ( 1986), Sperber & Wilson ( 1986), though the latter don't 
use the term discourse segmentation ). 
Strategies of inquiry are sequences of set-up moves, or questions, designed to (at least 
partially) satisfy the aims of the game, while obeying the game's constraints. Given that 
the main goal is to' answer the Big Question, a reasonable strategy will involve a plan to 
do this by developing sub-goals which are easier to achieve and are logically related to 
each other in such a way as to facilitate achieving the main goal. We can define an 
entailment relation on questions, following Groenendijk & Stokhof ( 1984: 16): One 
interrogative Q1 entails another Q2 iff every proposition that answers QI answers Qz 
as well. (This presupposes that we're talking about complete answers, for otherwise the 
entailments can actually go the other way around.) E.g.: What do you like? entails 
What food do you like?. An answer to the Big Question, What is the way things are?, 
entails the answer to any other possible question. We might call QI in such a relation the 
superquestion, and any Qz which it entails a subquestion. On the other hand, if we can 
answer enough subquestions, we have the answer to the superquestion. Given the 
ultimate aim of discourse and the rationality of the participants, these. types of relations 
are the principal factors that structure our moves. 
Of course, questions in discourse are generally more specific, and hence more 
manageable, than the Big Question. Besides the discourse goal of inquiry in its most 
general sense, we usually have goals in the real world, things we want to achieve quite 
apart from inquiry, domain goals. And our domain goals, in the form of deontic 
priorities, generally direct the type of inquiry which we conduct in conversatipn, the way 
we approach the question of how things are. We are, naturally, most likely to inquire 
first about those matters that directly concern the achievement of our domain goals. 
7This is in distinction to Carlson's epistemic dcsidernlum of a question, which has to do with increasing the 
knowledge of the questioner, or with the related views of Ginzburg ( 1994n). On the present view, it is the 
common ground, not the speaker, ihat's "informed", and it is mutual-belief-behavior, and not knowledge, 
that's sought. This permits a generalization over rhetorical questions, quiz questions, etc., which are 
problems for more solipsistic views of information in discourse. 
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Hence, domain goals tend to dictate which sub-questions of the Big Question we take up 
- at any given point. But, as discussed above, once we've committed ourselves to a given 
question, i.e. we plan to answer it, then we pursue it until and unless it is either answered 
or it becomes clear that it isn't presently answerable. The interlocutors' strategy in this 
pursuit may, however, include the decision to pursue answers to sub-questions, i.e. a 
series of related questions may realize a strategy to get at the answer to the most general, 
logically strongest question among them. Hence, a strategy of inquiry will have a 
hierarchical structure, a set of questions partially ordered by entailment. Things are 
actually more complex than this, as questions in an actual strategy may be only logically 
related in view of certain contextual entailments. But this is the basic nature of strategies, 
and in what follows I will assume that they have this idealized logical structure, 
relativized to context. 
Of course, there arc many sequences of questions in discourse which are apparent 
counterexamples to the constrained relation posited here. For example, at a gi vcn point 
an interlocutor might utter one after the other a number of relevant sub-questions to some 
super-question, without yet answering any of them. But this is just enumeration, 
suggesting a plan for how to attack the super-question; none of these questions has yet 
been proffered or accepted. We can only address such sub-questions one at a time. and 
when one is being addressed, we stick to it (or can complain to interlocutors who don't 
and thereby "change the subject"). In another type of case, someone might have an 
epiphany at some point, realize how some information just discussed bears on another, 
now dormant question, and introduce that. This can derail the conversation, and either 
we later try to get back on track with the strategy we were pursuing or else we just give it 
up and move on. But these are violations of the rules which only underline their general 
force. See also the brief discussion of the gucstions under discussion in corrective 
contexts, in §2. l, where these are a type of meta-gucstion about the discourse itself. 
One of Carlson's (1983) central insights is that dialogues are functionally organized by 
question/answer relations, though the questions arc often only implicit, inferred on the 
basis of other cues. We will see in the following section one way in which interlocutors 
can retrieve questions under discussion which arc only implicit, never explicitly asked: I 
will argue that prosodic focus in English presupposes the type of question under 
discussion, a presupposition which enables the hearer, with some other contextually 
given clues, to reconstruct that question and its relation to the strategy being pursued. 
This is just one example of the general case, which is modelled more abstractly in 
Planning Theory via Plan Inferencing Rules that permit us to infer interlocutors' plans 
from other information in the common ground plus what rs actually said. Similarly, 
sometimes answers which arc obviously entailed in a given context are not explicitly 
uttered, but are nonetheless entered into the common ground. These cases involve 
accommodation, in Lewis' (1979) sense, and are quite normal in discourse: if it is clear 
that an interlocutor presupposes a question or assertion ¢ which is not yet commonly 
agreed upon but the others have no objection, then they behave as if the common ground 
contained 1/J all along. Hence, the notion of a move in a discourse game is essentially 
semantic. A question is not necessarily realized by a speech act, but is only a question­
denotation in the technical sense that it proffers a set of relevant alternatives which the 
interlocutors commit themselves to addressing: 8 It tel ls you what the discourse is "about" 
at that pointin the discourse, and further, if we look at the strategy of questions in which 
it participates, it tells us where the discourse is going. 
80nc of the nice consequences of this semantic rc.:il ization of the notion of questions under discus::;lon, as 
opposed to Carlson's assumption that implicit questions arc actual r,arts of the text of a discourse, is that 
these more abslract questions needn't carry !he types of presuppositioos, especially existential 
presuppositions which are sometimes said to he associated with actual interrogative speech acls, 
96 CRAIGE ROBERTS 
In the remainder of this section, I will first, as a preliminary to developing a view of 
discourse as founded on questions, sketch a semantics for questions. Then I will turn to a 
formal charcterization of the notion of information structure that I have in mind. Finally, 
in §1.3, return to a consideration of the pragmatics of questions and answers, viewed as a 
corollary of their roles in information structure. · 
§1.1 A Semantics for Questions 
I adopt a semantics for questions which borrows various elements from the earlier work 
of Hamblin (1973), Groenendijk & Stokhof ( 1984), and von Stechow ( 1989), though it is 
different from each of these in important respects. As in Hamblin's account, a question 
will denote a set of alternatives, which I will call the Q-alternative set of the question. I 
borrow from Groenendijk & Stokhof the use of the partition established over a set of 
worlds by the Q-alternative set to define the notions of complete and partial answer to a 
question. And I adopt von Stechow's assumption that the Q-11lternatives of a question are 
all asked by the interlocutors and that this fact influences the common ground, though I 
make this part of the pragmatics of what it is to accept a question instead of part of its 
semantic denotation as in van Stechow. This account also differs from van Stechow's 
and from Groenendijk & Stokhofs in that I eschew a structured semantics for questions, 
nor do I co-generate question/answer pairs. In this account, the intimate relation between 
an assertion and the question it addresses, and hence (partially) answers, is generally 
reflected in prosodic focal presuppositions of the assertion. The latter are argued in §2 
below to be presuppositions about the role of the assertion with respect to the question 
under discussion in the information structure of the discourse. Throughout, I ignore the 
important question of how to analyze embedded questions. I assume that their semantics 
is different from that of main clause questions, though, of course, the two are closely 
related; cf. Jacobson (1995), Ginzburg (1995), and Higginbotham ( 1996) for some 
relevant discussion. 
In what follows, for any constituent a, lal is the regular denotation of a, arrived at by 
recursive, compositional rules in the usual fashion. The logical form of a question is 
assumed to include a wide-scope interrogation operator, ? . Within its scope, the wh­
clause in a question like Who arrived? is assumed to be who( h:[x arrived]), so that the 
wh-element is in prenex position, with the main clause interp!"eted as an abstract on its 
trace. For convenience, I will confine the wh-elements considered to who and what, 
since they are of the same semantic type. For a simple wh-question, the Q-alternative set 
denoted by the question is the set of propositions which can be derived by abstracting on 
its wh-phrase, then applying this abstract in turn to all the things in the model (entities, 
functions, whatever) which are of the same type as that denoted by the wh-phrase. This 
can be generalized as follows: 
(I) The Q-alternatives corresponding to utterance ofa clause a:9 10 
Q-alt(a), =(p: :lui·l,...,ui·n e D[p =l~l(ui-1)...(ui·n)]J, where 
9Note that this set differs from the alternatives determined by a question for von Stechow, since his 
alternatives vary simultaneously over both the wh-elcments in the que·stion rind its for.:used constituents, 
while I have separated out these two types of variation, as will become clear in §2 below. . · 
IOJt is not crucial here that the wh- elements be treated as operutors. In the LFs assumed here, the role of the 
prenex wh-elements is primarily to mark their scope. Otherwise, I might have assumed that the wh­
elements themselves are distinguished variables, following Ginzburg (1995), with a special null operator, 
like his QUANT-CLOSURE operator, unselectively binding all the free wh-variables at the appropriate 
level. The facts about scoping of wh-elements, especially relative to scope of other types of operators, 
remain unclear to me, as does the empirical content of positing null operators. Hence, I leave this issue 
addressed here. 
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<l has the logical form whi-1, ...,Whi-n(~). with {whi-1, ...,whi-nl the 
(possibly empty) set of wh-elements in ex, and 
D is the domain of the model for the language, suitably sortally restricted 
(e.g. to humans for who, non-humans for what). 
( l) defines a set of alternatives for any utterance, even non-questions. We abstract over 
any wh-elements there may be in the utterance and then permit the variables of 
abstraction to vary freely over entities of the appropriate sort in the model. Yes/no 
questions contain no wh-elements, so by (I) the set of Q-alternatives to a yes/no question 
?(a) will be just the singleton set { lexl). 
The semantics for questions is quite simple. The denotation of a question is its Q­
alternative set:11 
(2) Interpretation of a Question ?ex: 
l?al = Q-alt( ex) 
For a question like Who did Mary invite?, if we take who to. be of type e, the Q­
alternative set described would not include the answer Nobody, though this is presumably 
felicitous. So the Q-alternative set isn't necessarily the set of ALL possible answers to 
the question: Of course, if we assumed that who is of higher type, say a generalized 
quantifier of type <<e,t>,t>, then nobody would be of the appropriate type to give as 
value for the corresponding abstraction. But as we will shortly see, we won't have to 
assume anything about the type of who in order to permit such an answer. 
To answer a question, we must evaluate all the elements of its Q-alternative set to see 
which, if any, are true. Answerhood is defined as follows: 
(3) A partial answer to a question q is a proposition which contextually entails the 
evaluation -- either true or false -- of at least one element of Q-alt(q). A complete 
answer is a proposition which contextually entails an evaluation for each element 
of Q-alt(q). 
Suppose we have only two propositions in the Q-alternative set for some question, p and 
q. The set of complete answers to the question are those which entail one member of the 
set in (4): · 
(4) I(p & q), (p & -.q), (-.p & q). (-.p & -.q) l 
Note that this set establishes a partition on any given set of possible worlds, including the 
context set for a given utterance; for in any given world, one and only one of these four 
possible formulae can be true, and in an interesting set of worlds, there will be some in 
which each of these formulae is true. Each complete answer corresponds to a cell in the 
partition and its acceptance leads to discarding all the other cells, as in the informal 
definition (I) in the preceding section. 
To illustrate, consider the following example: 
111 adopt this seman.tics without argument here. It is just 1he simples! type of denotalion for questions 
consistent with the alternative semantic account of focus and questions which I develop below. Nothing in 
the proposals about Information Structure and focus hinges on (2), so that one might substitute another type 
of interpretation for questions. 
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(5) Who did Mary invite? logical form: ?[Who (;\.x.Mary invited x)] 
(6) l?(Who did Mary invite)!= Q-alt(Who (h.Mary invited x)) = 
{p: 3u e D[p = I;\.x.Mary invited xl(u)]} = 
(Mary invited u: u e DJ 
If the proffered (5) is accepted by the interlocutors, they will then be committed ·to 
answering the question, i.e. evaluating all the alternatives it proffers. Suppose that there 
are only three people in the model, so that D = (Mary, Alice, Grace}; then Q-alt(5) will 
be the set in (7) (assuming the relation denoted by invite is irreflexive, and ignoring joins 
of individuals in the model): 
(7) {Mary.invited Alice, Mary invited Grace} 
If we take Mary invited Alice to be p, and Mary invited Grace to be q, then (5) 
corresponds to the partition suggested by (4). If- the partition is established on a 
reasonably rich context set, the set of complete answers will include Mary invited Alice 
and Grace, Mary invited Alice but not Grace, Mary invited Grace but not Alice, and 
Mary invited no one, the last of these picking out the cell corresponding to the formula 
-.p & -.q .. A partial answer would be an utterance whose truth rules out at lea.st one of 
the cells of the partition; e.g., Mary didn't invite Grace, ruling out both of the cells in 
which q is true but leaving open the question of whether Mary invited Alice. All 
· complete answers are partial answers, but not vice versa. 
Given the way we have defined answerhood in (3), we can define some other useful 
terms for discussing questions: 
(8) A question qJ entails another question q2 iff answering (i.e., giving an answer . 
to1 qJ yields a complete answer to q2. 
· [cf. Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984: 16] 
(9) A question qJ contextually entails another q2 iff answering qJ in a discourse 
context with common ground c (a set of propositions) is such that c uanswer(q/) 
entails a complete answer to q2. 
I will assume without argument that an utterance may partially answer a question either 
by directly asserting a partial answer, by contextually entailing a partial answer, or by 
presupposing or conversationally irnplicating something which contextually entails a 
partial answer to the question. · 
The semantics for questions I have given in this section is essentially static. It will serve 
the purposes of the static view of information structure presented in the following section. 
However, in §1.3, I wi II consider the question of how presuppositions are projected in 
questions, and this will necessitate a dynamic view of questions and of the information 
structure in which they play a role. Hence, I will present a context change potential for 
questions in dynamic information structure. However, though defining an update 
function over a set of q-alternatives is rather more complex than giving static semantic 
interpretations, the simple semantics presented here still represents the heart of the 
proposal, along with the notions of answerhood and of question entailment. 
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§1.2 A formal theory of information structure 
In this section, I will explore a formal definition of the information structure of a 
discourse, taking it to be the set of moves in the discourse, both questions and answers, 
explicit and implicit (pragmatically retrieved), along with various functions and relations 
on them, including the structure induced by the strategy or strategies which order the 
questions. The question/answer relation gives us pairs of moves, the pairs in turn 
partially ordered by the strategic relation on the questions. Note that just as questions 
may be only indirectly "asked", answers may in fact be provided by a sequence of one or 
more assertions; deriving an answer may even require inferences drawn on the basis of 
such sequences, so that the structure is more complex than that of a simple 
question/answer dialogue, though I cannot investigate such matters in detail here. 
There are a couple of w<1ys I could imagine defining information structure formally. 
Here is one: 
(10) The information structure for a discourse Dis a tuple, 
InfoStro = < M, Q, A,<, Ace, CG, QUD >, where:12 
Mis the set of(setup and payoff) moves in the.discourse. 
Q s;; M is the set of questions (setup moves) in M, where a question is a set of 
propositions. 
As;; Mis the set of assertions (payoff moves) in M, where an assertion is a set of 
possible worlds. 
< is the precedence relation, a total order on M; mi< mk iff mi is made/uttered 
before mk in D; the order of any two elements under< will be reflected in 
the natural order on their indices, where for all mi, i E N. 
Ace s M, is the set of accepted moves. 
CG is a function from M to sets of propositions, yielding for each m E M the 
common ground of D just prior to the utterance of m. Further, we require 
that: 
a. for all mk E M, CG(mk) ;;;i Ui<k(CG(mi)), 
b. for all mk EM, CG(mk) ;;;i {mi: i<k.and mi E Acc\Q}, and 
c. for all mk, mi E M, i<k, 
i. the proposition that mi E Mis in CG(mk), 
ii. if mi E Q, the proposition that mi E Q is in CG(mk), 
iii. if mi e A, the proposition that mi e A is in CG(mk), 
iv. ifmi E Ace, the proposition that mi E Ace is in CG(mk), 
v. for all propositions p E CG(mi), the proposition that p e 
CG(mi) is in CG(mk), and 
vi. whatever the value of QUD(mi ), the proposition that that is the 
value of QUD(mi) is in CG(mk). 
120ne might want to define a discourse as the set of explicit moves made in a period of time between a set 
of interlocutors. In that case, there might be different sets of possible implicit interpolated moves Iha! the 
interlocutors could "agree" on, with different resulting informatino structures. Hence, one would talk not 
about the infonnation structure for the discourse, but about an information structure for the discourse. In 
what follows, I assume that a discourse consists of all the moves made within it, implicit as well as explicit, 
though this isn't crucial. In either case, one might also add a set Exp to the tuple, the subset of M which 
consists of all the explicit moves in the discourse. 
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QUD, the questions-under-discussion stack, is a function from M (the moves in 
the discourse) 13 to ordered subsets of QnAcc such that for all m E M: 
a. for all q E QnAcc, q E QUD(m) iff 
i. q < m (i.e., neither m nor any subsequent questions are 
included), and 
ii. CG(m) fails to entail an answer to q and q has not been 
determined to be practically unanswerable. 
b. QUD(m) is (totally) ordered by <. 
c. for all q, q' E QUD(m), if q < q', then the complete answer to q' 
contextually entails a partial answer to q. 
Since we are only considering questions and assertions, I will assume that the set of 
assertions in D is the complement of Qin M. 
Note that not all moves in a discourse are necessarily accepted, so that Ace will generally 
be a proper suhset of the set of M. Presumably, we keep track of proposed questions and 
assertions, even if they're rejected, an accounting which is crucial, e.g., in explaining 
denials and corrections. But unlike Carlson's view of discourse, the moves that we keep 
track of are semantic entities, the information expressed by .the utterances in the 
discourse, and not structural analyses of those utterances. This seems desirable in view 
of the psycholinguistic literature which suggests a fairly rapid loss of structural 
information about preceding discourse. 
The constraint on the value of CG for any move, making it a super-set of the common 
ground for any previous move, guarantees that the common ground will be monotonic, 
preserving information contributed earlier. Of course, discourse isn't always monotonic 
in this sense, hut I will ignore this problem here. We also require that the common 
ground include all those previous accepted moves which are not questions, i.e. the 
previous accepted assertions, in keeping with Stalnaker's characterization of what it is to 
accept an assertion. By making the common ground a possibly proper superset of 
previous common grounds and of the set of accepted assertions, we leave open the 
possibility that additional information is added not only by accepted pay-off 
moves/assertions, but also possibly by accommodated implicatures, inferences, common 
perceptual experience, etc. Clause (c) is intended to capture the fact that at any given 
point in the discourse, the interlocutors have complete information about the information 
structure itself, including what moves have been made, which were questions and which 
assertions, which were accepted, what was in the common ground at the point a given 
move was made, and what questions were under discussion at that point. 
The set of questions under discussion at a given point in a discourse is. modelled using a 
push-down store, which I call the QUD stack. Intuitively, QUD yields the ordered set of 
all as-yet unanswered but answerable, accepted questions in Q at the time of utterance of 
q. When we accept a question, we add it to the top of the stack. Its relationship to any 
question previously on top will be guaranteed by a combination of Relevance, entailing a 
commitment to answering prior questions, and logical constraints on the way that the 
stack is composed. Ir we decide to pursue an accepted question by asking a sub-question, 
we may add the sub-question to the stack, so that the stack reflects (part of) a strategy of 
questions. When a question is answered or determined to be practically unanswerable, it 
is popped off the stack, revealing any below it. At any point in discourse, the question on 
top of the stack is the (immediate) question under discussion. 
DEven assertions or questions which are rejected by the participants can be determined to have been 
felicitous (or nol) in terms of their relation lo lhe Information Structure of the discourse in which they 
occur. Hence, the domain ofQUD isn't restricted to Jhc accepted moves. 
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I will discuss directly below the motivation for clause (c) in the definition of QUD. But 
first, so that this discussion is not entirely abstract, let me illustrate how the QUD stack 
works with a very simple and rather excessively explicit discourse. This example 
presupposes a model with only two individuals, Hilary and Robin, and two kinds of 
foods, bagels and tofu. I assume that each of the questions in the discourse (Do) is 
accepted by the interlocutors: · 
CDo) I. Who ate what? 
a. What did Hilary eat? 
!lj. Did Hilary eat bagels? 
Ans(a;) Yes. 
au. Did Hilary eat tofu? 
Ans(a;;) Yes. 
b. What did Robin eat?. 
b;. Did Robin eat bagels? 
Ans(b;) No. 
b;;. Did Robin eat tofu? 
A11s(b;;) Yes. 
This entire discourse realizes a strategy to answer the first question, move (Doi); here, 
the questions involved stand in simple entailment relations. For each question in (Do), 
the set of questions which it entails is given below. (These relations are also reflected in 
the indentation hierarchy in the layout of the discourse.): 
l=(l) = { a,a; ,a;; ,b,b; ,b;; ) 
l=(a) = {a;,aii} 
l=(b) = {b;,b;;J 
Note also that the following facts hold in the model described: 
(11) Given that the domain of the model= {hilary, robin, bagels, tofu}, then 
Ans(a;)nAns(a;;) = Ans(a), i.e. giving complete answers to (a;) and (a;;) yields a 
complete answer to (a). Answering (a;) hence yields a partial answer to 
(a), and similarly for (a;;). 
Ans(b;)('Ans(b;;) = Ans(b), i.e. giving complete answers to (b;) and (b;;) yields a 
complete answer to (b). Answering (b;) hence yields a partial answer to 
(b), and similarly for (bii), 
Ans(a)nAns(b) = Ans(!), i.e. giving complete answers to (a) and (b) yields a 
complete answer to (I). Answering (a) hence yields a partial answer to 
( l ), and similarly for (b). 
Since partial answerhood is transitive under (I), answering (a;), (a;;), (b;), or (b;;) 
yields a partial answer to (I). 
Intuitively, it is partly because of these four facts that (Do) realizes a successful strategy 
for answering (I). As each question in (Do) is asked, it is added to the QUD stack, with 
(I) on the bottom. When a sub-question is answered, e.g. (a;), that question is popped 
from the stack and the answer added to the common ground. When (a;) and (a;;) have 
been answered, the common ground then entails the answer for (a), as stated in the first 
fact in (11 ), and then (a) is popped as well. When both (a) and (b) have been answered in 
this way, the common ground yields the answer for (a), as reflected in the third fact in 
(11 ); then (I) is popped as well, leaving the QUD stack empty (insofar as this discourse 
comes out of the blue). 
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The logical relations among the questions in (Do) are also what guarantee that the QUD 
stack for (Do) satisfies clause (c) in the definition of QUD, which basically requires that 
higher questions on the stack. be sub-questions of the lower, previously accepted 
questions on the stack. The ordering function < in InfoStroo yields the total order 
<l,a,ai,Ans(ai),aii,Ans(aii),b, bi,,Ans(bi),bi;,Ans(bii)>, and the QUD function is as 
follows: 
QUD(I) = ¢ QUD(a) = <I> QUD(ai) = <l,a> 
QUD(Ans(ai)) = <l,a,ai> 
QUD(aii) = <l,a> 
QUD(Ans(aii)) <l,a,aii> 
QUD(b) = <I> QUD(b;) = <l,b> 
QUD(Ans(bi )) = <l,b,bi> 
QUD(bii) <l,b> 
QUD(Ans(bii)) = <l,b,bii> 
To satisfy clause (c) of the definition of QUD, in each of the ordered sets just listed, each 
element must be such that its complete answer entails a partial answer to any element to 
its left. So, given <I ,b;bii>, answering (bii) must entail a partial answer to (b) as well as 
to (I), and answering (b) must entail a partial answer to (I), etc. This is exactly what the 
facts in ( 11) tell us. 
We can now define the notion of a strategy of inquiry relative to some topic, or question 
under discussion, in terms of the QUD function, as follows: 
(12) For any question q e QnAcc, Strat(q), the strategy of inquiry which aims at 
answering q, is the ordered pair <q,S>, where S is the set such that: 
If there are no q' E Q such that QUD(q') = <...q>, then S = ¢; 
otherwise, for all q' e Q, QUD(q') = <...q> iff Strat(q') E S. 
We might read the ordered pair which Strat yields for a given question q, <q,S>, as 'the 
strategy to answer q by conducting the set of sub-inquiries in S ', For (Do), Strat yields: 
Strat(ai) <ai,¢> 
Strat(aii) <aii,¢> 
Strat(a) <a,{<ai,¢>,<aii ,¢> }> 
Strat(bi) <bi,¢> 
Strat(bii) <bii,¢> 
Strat(b) ·<b, {<bi,¢> ,<b ii,¢>}> 
Strat(I) <I,{ <a,{ <ai ,¢>,<aii ,¢> }>,<b,{ <bi,¢>,<bii,¢> }>}> 
The final line tells us that (Do) involves a strategy to answer (I) by conducting two sub­
inquiries, that of answering (a) by answering (ai) and (aii), and that of answering (b) by 
answering (bi) and (bii), Because of the answerhood relation required by the definition of 
QUD and the way that Stratis defined in terms of QUD, we are assured that any question 
q is part of a strategy to answer a question q' only if a complete answer to q will 
contextually entail a partial answer to q'. It may be that there are more complex types of 
strategies whose characterization requires ordering the second element in the ordered pair 
103 INFORMATION STRUCTURE IN DISCOURSE 
<q,S>, but I won't investigate that here. Basically, rational considerations, in conne~tion 
with the information available in the common ground (and hence, what kinds of 
contextual inferences may potentially be drawn) will determine whether a strategy is 
well-formed. 
Note that we wouldn't want to strengthen clause (c). with the requirement that all 
questions on .a QUD stack entail those higher on the stack. This is illustrated by 
discourses like that in (13): 
(13) CG(A) ;;;:i { John is allergic to clams, one won't eat anything one is allergic to, one 
will eat something unless one has some reason not to) 
A: What kinds of seafood will John eat? 
B: Isn't John allergic to clams? 
Here, A's question doesn't entail an answer to B's. There might be reasons why John 
won't eat clams, even if he isn't allergic to them; e.g. John might ke.ep kosher. If the 
answer to B is Yes, he is, then this will contextually entail, in combination with the 
common ground for the discourse, that John won't eat clams, yielding a partial answer to 
A. However, if the answer to Bis No, he isn't, that won't by itself tell us that John WILL 
eat clams. Prima facie this suggests that the requirement in (!Od) may be itself too 
strong. But I think this apparent problem is resolved if we see that an answer to B is a 
partial answer to the question (14): 
(14) What reasons would John have for not eating clams? 
( 14) in turn is a way of exploring whether John will eat clams, given the assumption that 
one eats whatever one has no reason not to; hence an answer to (14) contextually entails a 
partial answer to (13A). I take it that (13B) implicitly assumes a bridging question like 
(14), making the resulting discourse well-formed under (IOd). 
As defined, the QUD function does not, and should not, require that it order a continuous 
sequence of questions. At any given time, QUD may not represent the entire strategy of 
inquiry with respect to the question on the "bottom" of the stack (i.e., the superquestion): 
some sub-questions may have already been answered, i.e. parts of the strategy already 
realized, so that they are no longer on the stack. E.g., in (Do) after answering (a) via 
answering (ail and (aii), all these questions pop off the stack when we turn to address (b), 
but they are still part of the strategy for answering (I). Also, in defining QUD, I assumed 
that a question is popped off the stack if it is answered or determined to be (practically) 
unanswerable. A question may also be popped offthe stack if some question lower in the 
stack is answered, even if the answered question doesn't directly entail the "higher" 
questions popped. This makes sense if we see the QUD stack as a fragment of a larger 
strategy. If we are committed to each question in turn, then each subsequent question 
must help to answer those already on the stack, even if indirectly. But our commitment is 
really to the overall strategy, so that commitment to individual questions is relative to our 
commitment to the earlier questions on the stack below. Then answering a lower 
question q relieves us of our commitment to any higher questions in St rat( q). E.g., in 
( 13), if C follows B's question with John keeps kosher, then the interlocutors may drop 
the unanswered question of whether John is allergic to clams, since they are most 
interested in the larger question ( 13A), to which they now have a partial answer. 
In view of what I said earlier about how questions structure discourse, we also want to 
guarantee that all of the non-question moves, i.e. the assertions, in a discourse are at least 
partial answers to accepted questions, and that in fact each is a (partial) answer to the 
question under discussion at the time of utterance. This will follow from the way that 
Relevance is defined within the framework of information structure. Suppose we define 
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the (immediate) question under discussion at the time of a move m to be 
last(QUD(m)), i.e., the last question in the ordered set QUD(m), We can now 
characterize the notion of Relevance in terms of the question under discussion at a given 
time (cf. Grice's relativization of his Maxim of Relevance to "the purposes of the 
discussion") and what it is to address such a question: 14 
(15) A move m is Relevant to the question under discussion q, i.e. to last(QUD(m)), 
iff m either introduces a partial answer to q (m is an assertion) or is part of a 
strategy to answer q (m is a question). 
Cooperative speakers strive to make their utterances Relevant, in keeping with the goals 
of the game. From this it follows that each move in a felicitous discourse, one with a 
proper information structure, will be Relevant to the question under discussion at the time 
of its utterance. So, each assertion in such a discourse will provide at least a partial 
answer to the question under discussion, as desired. Further, ( 15), in connection with 
clause (c) of the definition of QUD in ( I 0), captures the commitment involved in 
accepting a question: Given (c), a question cannot be removed from the set of questions 
under discussion unless it's answered or unanswerable; given Relevance, we know that a 
question can only be accepted if it furthers answering those to which the interlocutors are 
already committed, thereby perpetuating that commitment. 
Instead of the static characterization of the information strncture of a discourse which I 
have developed above one could define information structure in context change terms, a 
view which I plan to develop in subsequent work, One advantage of the the static 
characterization is that it offers a more global view, facilitating discussion of properties 
of InfoStr per se, apart from issues of context change; however, I believe that a more 
dynamic view yields other types of insight, especially pertaining to presupposition 
projection in questions. 
§1.3 Pragmatics of Questions in Information Structure 
The account sketched in §I.I derives the same end result as that given by von Stechow 
(1989), though it does so by drawing the line between semantics and pragmatics 
differently, If we were to adopt the central features of his account apart from strnctured 
propositions, the semantics for questions would be as in (16): 
(16) Interpretation of a Question ?(a), following von Stechow ( 1989): 
l?o:I = (w I every p E Q-alt( a) is asked in wJ, 
von Stechow's denotation of a question is a proposition: the set of worlds where every 
proposition in the corresponding set of Q-alternatives is asked, If a question is accepted 
by the interlocutors, this means that all the propositions in its Q-alternative set are asked. 
Under ( I 6), the denotation of (5) would be as follows: 
14This calls out for comparison with Sperber & Wilson's (1986) notion of Relevance, A detailed 
comparison is not possible here, but I will note two significnnt differences hetween their notion nnd that 
given in (15); First, Sperber & \Vilson's Relevance reflects their reductionist program, since it is intended 
(so far as I can understand) to play the role of all of the original Gricean conversational maxims. (15) is not 
reduction.ist; e,g,, it is not intended to account for Quantity implicatures, Second, Sperber & Wilson do not 
relativize their notion to the interlocutors' immediate intentions or goals (and in fact, they deny the very 
possibility of a common ground), so thi:it the maximizntion of infornrntiveness while minimizing processing 
cost is calculated absolutely, But the Relevance defined in (15) is, crucially, relativized to the question 
under discussion by the interlocutors, and hence, given the pragmatic function of questions in information 
structure, to the interlocutors' goals. 
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(5) Who did Mary invite? 
l?Who did Mary invite!= ( w I every p e Q-alt(Who did Mary invite) is ask.ed in 
w}= 
_{ w I every p e {Mary invited u: u e D} is asked in w} 
With D = (Mary, Alice, Grace}, as above, the question would have as denotation the set 
of ~orlds in ( 17) (assuming again that the relation denoted by invite is irreflexive, and 
ignoring joins of individuals in the model): 
( 17) ( w I Mary invited Alice and Mary invited Grace· are both asked in w J 
We might reasonably assume that von Stechow's questions, like other propositions, 
would contribute directly to the common ground, so that the prior context set would be 
reduced to include only those worlds in which all the Q-alternatives of o: are asked. This 
has the virtue of relating the acceptance of a question to the common ground. But what is 
it for a proposition to be "asked" in a world? von Stec how doesn't say, but perhaps it's 
this: If a proposition is asked, the interlocutors attempt to evaluate its truth. On this view 
of what asking is, (16) would entail (21). If a question is accepted, the common ground 
will be updated with the information that the interlocutors are committed to determining 
which of its Q-alternatives, if any, are true. But notice that this same incremental effect 
on the common ground, while not semantic, will still follow directly from the pragmatics 
for questions in (21) in conjunction with the semantics for questions in (2), the definition 
of an answer in (3), and the relationship between information structure and common 
ground discussed in §I.I. Once a question is accepted, so that by (21) its Q-alternative 
set under (2) is added to the QUO stack of the information structure, the inter:ocutors are 
committed to answering it (until and unless it's determined to be unanswerable). 
Answering a question entails giving an evaluation of all of the propositions in its Q­
alternative set; hence a commitment to answering involves asking each of those 
propositions, in the sense just defined. Recall that I assumed that the information 
structure of a discourse is known to all interlocutors, so that propositional information 
about it is in fact part of the common ground (see the clauses in (c) of the definition of 
CG in (10)); hence, the common ground will also entail that the question's Q-alternatives 
are asked. So the present account yields the same results as von Stechow's, but separates 
out pragmatic from semantic aspects of the contribution of questions to discourse. 
Recall that a question is, in some respects at least, like an imperative, and this proposal 
for the semantics for questions, Iike van Stechow's, should be judged partly in that light. 
If accepted, an imperative commits the hearer to trying to make the corresponding 
assertion true; i.e., it commits the hearer to a certain domain goal. If accepted, a question 
commits the hearer to trying to add its answer to the common ground; i.e.·, it commits the 
hearer to a certain discourse goal. Saying that the acceptance of a question involves a 
commitment on the part of the interlocutors would suggest that we could answer a 
question with a refusal, just as we can refuse to accept an imperative. That seems right, 
and is compatible with both the treatment in (2)/(21) and that in (16). However, if we say 
that the proffered content of a question is a proposition, as fn (16), this would also 
suggest that we could deny its truth, as with assertions. But, though. we can answer 
imperatives with "No", it doesn't seem quite right to me to refuse a question by denying 
its truth, as in, "No, it's not true that I'm committed to discussing that question". This is 
the only ,empirical evidence that I'm aware of in favor of the more pragmatic account 
developed here, involving (2) and (21 ), over the more semantic accounts in ( 16) or van 
Stechow ( 1989). It is possible that careful consideration of the facts about indirect 
questions will bear on this issue, as well, but that remains to be seen. The principal 
reason I have adopted the pragmatic account is in virtue of the way that its treatment of 
the pragmatics of questions parallels the elegant treatment of assertion by Stalnaker, 
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while avoiding the complications of structured propositions. Whatever we make of these 
considerations, I do think that utterance of a question, when it is accepted by the other 
interlocutors, at least has von Stechow's effect indirectly. Knowing what a question is, 
and what it is to accept it, the interlocutors know that this is the question under 
discussion. 
There are a number of other important aspects of the pragmatics of questions which I do 
not have the space to discuss in detail here. See Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984), 
Ginzburg (1995) for discussions of some of these, Roberts (in preparation) for an 
extended examination within the present framework. One of these aspects, not resolved 
elsewhere in the literature so far as I know, is part of the motivation for the way in which 
the semantics of questions is formulated in the present account, and is directly relevant to 
the relationship between presupposed and proffered meaning posited in the Information 
Structure framework: This is the question of how presuppositions project in questions, 
and in particular, of how it is that questions are holes to presupposition, in the sense of 
Karttunen ( 1973). I.e., a question with the logical form ?a has all the presuppositions of 
a. Given the semantics for questions I proposed in §1.1, we might expect_ that all of the 
q-alternatives of ?a, i.e. the instantiations of a, would carry the presuppositions of a, but · 
that doesn't explain why the entire question inherits them as well. 
By presupposition, I have in mind the phenomenon described by Stalnaker ( 1979) and 
Heim (1983,1992): An_uiterance of¢! presupposes proposition p iff ¢J is felicitous in 
any given context c only when c entails p. In order for the context to entail p, the 
context set should be a subset of p. Note that the presupposition projection properties of 
questions _do not automatically follow from the sort of treatment exemplified by the von 
Stechow (1989) semantics in ( 16), even though in it the proffered content of the question 
is directly added to the common ground. The proferred content itself is only indirectly 
related to one of the question's q-alternatives. It doesn't automatically carry along the 
presuppositions of those q-alternatives, because there is nothing in his semantics that 
would prevent the interrogative operator itself from being a plug to presuppositions, 
blocking them from projecting to the entire question. 
In Heim ( 1982, 1983, 1992), presuppositional felicity for assertions follows from their 
. context change potentials: For example, in order to calculate the context change for an 
assertion with negation, you first have to temporarily update the context set at the time of 
utterance with the material under the scope of negation, then subtract the resulting 
context set from the actual context set: 
(18) Heim's (1992) Context Change Potential for Negation: 
c + not <I> is defined just in case c + <I> is, 
in which case c + not <I> = c\(c+q>). 
But the function determining update of contexts, and hence c+ ¢!, is only defined when all 
of the presuppositions of the assertion to be added, ¢!, are entailed by the context set. So 
the very possibility of updating the context with the negative assertion in her technical 
sense requires the satisfaction of any presuppositions of material .under the scope of 
negation. One can argue that by making the facts about presupposition projection follow 
from the nature of the update operation and the standard semantics for negation, Heim 
has explained the presupposition projection properties of negative assertions. This is the 
type of explanation we want for the presupposition properties of questions, as well. I 
can't see a non-stipulative way to incorporate such an account into von Stechow's 
semantics. But a dynamic version of Information Structure has the potential to offer such 
an account, although it will have to await further work. 
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Finally, one thing which has long puzzled me is how posing a question affects the context 
of the discourse in which occurs, in view of the question's denotation. The theory of 
information structure outlined above suggests an answer, one which is related to von 
Stechow's semantics for questions. Recall Stalnaker's pragmatics of assertion, 
paraphrased in ( 19): 
( 19) Pragmatics of Assertion: (following Stalnaker 1979) 
If an assertion is accepted by the interlocutors in a discourse, it is added to the 
common ground at that point in the discourse. I.e., in discourse D with InfoStro, 
for payoff move m; and the subsequent move m;+J, ifm; e Acco(m;+Jl, then m; 
e CGo(m;+1l­
(l 9) is the pragmatics for a pay-off move. Then for set-up moves, we adopt the parallel 
(20): 
(20) Pragmatics of Questions: 
(a) If a question is accepted by the interlocutors in a discourse, then it is 
added to the set of questions under discussion. I.e., in discourse D with 
InfoStro, for question move m; and the subsequent move m;+J, if m; e 
Acco(m;+tl, then m; e QUD0(m;+1). 
(b) A member of the set of questions under discussion in a discourse D is 
removed from that set iff it is either answered or determined to be 
unanswerable. I.e., in discourse D with InfoStro, for moves m;, mk and 
mk+J such that m; < mk < mk+t and m; e QUDo(mk), m; El. 
QUDo(mk+I) iff n(CG(mk+l )) s;; a, a a complete answer form;, or 
n(CG(mk+I )) s;; 7t, 7t the proposition that m; is unanswerable. 
Addition to the QUD stack entails a strong commitment to answering the question. If a 
question is accepted by the interlocutors, they are committed to answering it; unless it is 
determined to be unanswerable, it will remain on the stack until answered. Since the 
InfoStr containing the QUD stack is reflected in the common ground, the fact of this 
commitment is reflected there as well. Finally, given the way entailment among 
questions and answerhood are defined, in case a question is removed from the QUD 
stack, any questions it entails are removed from the QUD stack, as well. Note that (19) 
and (20) are only the principal pragmatic effects of questions and assertions; there are 
others, as well. E.g., if a question is asked, the fact that it is asked is entered into the 
common ground, whether or not it is accepted, this by virtue of the fact that the asking is 
a speech act performed in full knowledge of all the interlocutors, and that such (non­
linguistic) shared information is .also represented in the common ground. And if the 
question is accepted, then the interpretation of the question and the fact that it was added 
to the set of questions under discussion at that point also becomes part of the common 
ground, by virtue of the way that the character of the changing InfoStr is continuously 
reflected in the common ground. 
§2. Focus and Information Structure 
§2.1 The Presuppositions of Prosodic Focus in English 
Skillful interlocutors in discourse expend a good deal of effort making sure that at any 
given point all the participants are clear about what the common ground is like, including 
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what they are talking about (the question under discussion), and how what they're talking 
about relates to the rest of the information in the common ground (the strategy of inquiry 
they're following and its general relationship to the information structure of the 
discourse). As Mike Calcagno (p.c.) pointed out, in a competitive game players hide 
their strategies; in a cooperative game they make their strategies explicit. Language is 
cooperative, even when we're using it to compete. Redundancy helps to assure that the 
cooperation in sharing information is effective. l!i 
One of the tools we use to realize desirable redundancy is presupposition, which also 
serves to help give coherence to discourse, as we will see. Recall that utterance of a 
linguistic expression ¢ is only felicitous if the context of utterance entails the 
presuppositions of ¢ . This means that when an utterance has a presupposition, this is a 
conventional redundancy -- the presupposition is already at least entailed by the context, 
if not explicitly part of the common ground. But this built-in redundancy of 
presuppositions can be used, as has often been noted, to actually introduce information 
which was only implicitly assumed previously, or even not previously introduced at all. 
If an utterance has a conventionally expressed presupposition, it is often quite clear what 
the context should be like in order for it to be felicitous. And if the context isn't quite like 
that but the hearer is cooperative and has no objection to the truth of the presupposed 
information, she will accommodate it -- behave as if the context included that information 
all along, and hence as if the utterance which triggered the presupposition were felicitous. 
Consider the gossip's use of factive verbs to i.ntroduce scandalous information with 
impugnity -- lsn 't it shocking that Mary has run away from home?. 
I will argue here that intonational focus in English is presuppositional, giving information 
about the type of information structure in which the utterance associated with it occurs 
and its role in that structure. It is thereby redundant, given the fact that the information 
structure is in principle common information. And interlocutors use this redundancy to 
indirectly convey information about the information structure they intend. The main idea 
is that assertions, like questions, are conventionally associated with a set of alternatives, 
although these alternatives are presupposed by the prosody rather than proffered as are 
the Q-alternati ves of questions. Focal alternatives are calculated on the basis of the 
placement of prosodic focus in the utterance, along lines similar to those developed in the 
theories of Rooth ( 1985, 1992) and van Stech ow ( 1989), among others. It has long been 
noted (see, e.g., Jackendoff ( 1972)) that in question/answer pairs, the prosody of the 
answer constrains the questions which it can answer; in this theory, as in the others just 
cited, this relationship will be reflected in a condition on the relationship between the 
alternatives associated with each member in the pair, the Q-alternatives of the question 
and the focal alternatives of the answer. Also, it has been occasionally noted in other 
connections (cf., e.g., the discussion of yes/no vs. alternative questions in von Stechow 
( 1989)) that the set of alternatives proffered by a question may depend in part on its 
prosody. This is reflected in the present theory in the assumption that prosody plays a 
role in determining a set of focal alternatives for questions, as well as for assertions. In a 
question these alternatives constrain the type of super-question it may be related to in the 
strategy of inquiry. Hence, this is an alternative semantics account of prosodic focus. 
However, it differs from other recent accounts along these lines (Rooth ( 1985), von . 
Stechow ( 1989), Krifka ( 1992)) in that it does not assume any direct focus sensitivity for 
particles like English only or even, or in the other operators and particles discussed in the 
extensive linguistics literature on focus. In this respect, it is in the same vein as the 
recent work of Rooth (1992), Schwarzschild (1994a,1994b) and von Fintel (1995), who 
also attempt to. derive certain focus effects pragmatically, though they develop different 
mechanisms. 
L'For an enlightening discussion of the value and role of informational redundancy .in discourse, see 
Walker (1993). 
109 INFORMATION STRUCTURE IN DISCOURSE 
I am explicitly confining myself here to discussion of the role of English prosodic focus, 
and hence am not making claims about some universal linguistic phenomenon, Focus. 
With Rooth (1996), I would argue that instead we need to give detailed analyses of 
particular conventional elements in particular languages. However, I do assume that 
information structure is a universal of human discourse. And the persistent intuitions on 
the part of researchers that there are universals of information structure (topic, focus, 
theme/rheme, etc.), plus the persistent linkage of focus with the question/answer 
paradigm, need to be explained. If we assume that discourse has a functional structure of 
· the sort I'm proposing, then we can go quite a bit of the way towards·explaining these 
intuitions, while leaving open the possibility that syntactic constructions and other 
conventional factors in various languages contribute to fulfilling these functions in 
somewhat different ways. 
Let me briefly sketch what I mean by English intonational focus. Then I will turn to a 
more detailed proposal of how the presuppositions arise and what their content is. I will 
make the following, somewhat simplified assumptions about the prosodic phonology of 
focus: 16 
(22) The Phonology of Focus: 
(a) There is at least one intonation phrase per sentential (or sentential­
fragment) utterance. 
(b) There is at least one focused sub-constituent (possibly non-proper) per 
intonation phrase. This focused constituent is marked with the feature F 
in what follows. 
(c) There is at least one pitch accent per focused constituent, associated with a 
subconstituent. 
(d) Every pitch accent must be associated with material in a focused 
constituent. 
(e) There is one phrase accent (H- or L-) and one boundary tone (Hor L) per 
intonation phrase. 17 
(t} The string-final pitch accent in the focused constituent is assigned the 
most prominent stress in .the intonation phrase (Nuclear Stress Rule). 
All of the following prosodic factors are probably pragmatically (and hence potentially, 
semantically) significant: 
(23) Pragmatically Significant Prosodic Factors: 
(a) the choice of intonation phrase constituent(s) (which I tentatively assume 
are always correlated with syntactic constituents); and 
(b) within the intonation phrase, 
(i) the choice of focused constituent, 
(ii) the placement of pitch accent(s), 
(iii) the choice of pitch accent(s), and of phrase accent and boundary 
tone. 
(c) the relative prominence of different intonation phrases, both within an 
utterance and across utterances. 
16See Selkirk (1984) for a fairly detailed exploration of the issues and discussion of many valuable 
examples; my assumptions about prosody are adopted from her work, except where noted. Selkirk's work, 
in turn, relied heavily on the work of Pierrehumbert (1980) on the phonology of tone, including pitch 
accents; see also Liberman & Pierrehumbert (1984). 
l7Jn Liberman & Pierrehumbert (1984), boundary tones are realized at the end of their associated intonation 
phrase, while phrase accents effect a transition between the last pitch accent in the intonation phrase and 
the boundary tone. See Beckman & Ayers (1994) for a somewhat different account, involving intermediate 
intonation phrases, as well. 
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Though I will concentrate in this section on the significance of the selection of focused 
constituent, the other factors are surely important to a full understanding of the 
phenome_na usually grouped under the term "Focus", and in §2.2.2.2 I will note the 
crucial role in certain examples of (23a) and (23c), the choice of intonation phrase 
constituents and their relative prominence within an utterance. 18 
The above assumptions reflect the fact that all English utterances bear prosodic focus 
(tonal and rhythmic prominence) on at least one constituent, though that focus may be 
broad.or narrow (see Ladd (1980) and examples below). In keeping with this and with 
the methodological principle of semantic compositionality, the theory I offer aims to give 
a unified account of the semantics of English prosodic focus across all utterance types, 
whereas most theories address only one or two contexts of use and some authors even 
claim that no unified account is possible. Note also that the assumptions about the 
placement of pitch accents and stress within focused constituents assure that the feature F 
is invariably realized in the surface form of the utterance by rhythmic and tonal 
prominence. The prosodic realization of focus is not universally assumed by those 
working on the semantics of focus. See Partee (1991) and Krifka ( 1992) for examples 
where foci crucially are NOT so realized. There are no abstract foci in the present 
analysis of English; for the time being, my critique of oth'er approaches will have to 
remain implicit in the way the present approach is developed.. 
I want to bring special attention to (22d), .the assumption that all pitch accents must be 
within focused constituents (c,f. Selkirk's ( 1983:282), Focus Domination of Pitch Accent). 
It entails that if an utterance bears a single narrow (often called "contrastive") focus on 
some constituent x, the rema_inder of _the utterance bears no intonational prominence, so 
that its contour sounds flat to the ear of the native speaker. Selkirk talks about pitch 
accent placement.in terrns of "old" and "new" information. Unaccented elements of an 
utterance (or at least NPs and other arguments which would otherwise normally bear 
accent) are taken to be "old information", accented constituents are taken to be "new 
information", but Selkirk doesn't make precise the sense she would give to those terms. 
Within .the present account, we can offer a more precise sense for those terms. -- they are 
taken to be part of the question under discussion.19 I take the expression old to be 
synonymous with given by the question under discussion, and new (in the sense relevant 
here) to mean 'not given by'the question under discussion'. 
The focal alternatives for a given utterance are defined as follows: 211 
181 must ignore the issue or'the significance of multiple intonation phrases per utterance, and I will only 
briefly comment briefly on the significance ofvadous combinations of phrase accent and boundary tone, 
though I feel certain that these matters warrant careful investigation. And there arc a number of interesting 
questions about pitch accent placement within focused constituents (see Selkirk 1984), and about the choice 
of pitch accents (see Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg ( 1990)) which I must also ignore. Another issue that 
needs to be addressed in more detail is the questio.n of where in the grammar (e.g., at what level of 
representation) these conventional elements should be encoded. Selkirk encodes them at SS ("surface 
structure") in a Government-and-Binding style grammar, both to capture the fact that the relationship 
between pitch accent placement and F-marking appears to be syntactically constrained and so that this 
information is available to both PF ("phonologicai°form") and LI' ("logical fonn"). I have not seen a 
careful exploration of Lhese issues in a constraint-based grammatical framework. 
19Selkirk points out that it appears that unaccented NPs sometimes occur even phrase-finally within a 
focused constituent, and still they seem to be old information in the sense intended here. This suggests to 
me that we may need to reconsider the phonological representation of focus in some respects, but I can't 
explore that in the present paper. 
2°Rooth (1985) and von Stechow (1989) don't define alternatives in this way. Instead, as in Krilka (1992), 
alternative sets arc cancelled out when the constituent which-detcnnines them is argument to a focus­
sensitive operator. That is not the case with the definition I offer here, and the difference should be borne 
in mind in comparing· this account with those of Rooth, Krilka, or van Stechow. For simple cases, (24) 
yields the same results as !he assumption that focused constituents arc raised at Logical Form, and that such 
raising i_s island-insensitive (see Rooth (1995)). However, sec Rochcmont &.Culicover (1990) for 
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(24) The focus alternative set corresponding to a constituent p, IIPII, is the set of all 
interpretations obtained by replacing all the F-marked (focused) constituents in p 
with variables, and then interpreting the result relative to each member of the set 
of all assignment functions which vary at most in the values they assign to those 
variables.21 
Given (24), both questions and their answers, assertions, have corresponding alternative 
sets, the Q-alternatives of the questions, and the focal alternatives of their answ.ers. This 
observation is the basis of von Stechow's ( 1989:36) notion of question/answer 
congruence, modified and generalized in (25): 
(25) Move Pis congruent to a question ?a iff its focal alternatives IIPII are the Q­
alternatives determined by ?a, i.e. iff II pn =Q-alt(a). 
[after von Stechow ( 1989)] 
Given (24) and (25), the assertion in (5b) is a congruent answer to the question in (Sa): 
(5) a. Who did Mary invite? 
b. Mary invited nobodyF, 
The set of focal alternatives for (5b) (with the empirically correct focus in this context) is 
the same as the Q-alternative set for (Sa). Congruence doesn't require that the answer be 
among the corresponding set of alternatives (and in this respect is like the answerhood 
relation giv.en in the previous section), but only that the answer and question evoke the 
same set of alternatives. Further, note that this theory of questions and answers gives a 
question like (5a) no existential presuppositions. The propositions in its Q-alternative set 
do all entail the existence of someone invited, but these propositions are just asked, not 
asserted; the question/answer relationship as defined above does not require that the 
answer be one of the Q-alternatives. They may all be false, as entailed by (Sb), in which 
case there is no existential implication. 
Consider the following presupposition of prosodic focus for assertions, generalized from 
the requirement for question/answer pairs in von Stechow ( 1989) and Rooth ( 1992): 
(26) Presupposition of pros?dic focus in an assertion p: 
p is a congruent answer to the question under discussion at the time of its 
utterance. 
Given (26), the prosodic focus on an assertion presupposes that the current goal of the 
discourse is to choose among the alternatives in II pn. 
This works fine for question/answer pairs like (5). But questions also bear prosodic 
focus, and we want a more general principle than (26), one which tells us the meaning of 
prosodic focus in an utterance of any mood. Recall that questions can be logically related 
to each other, and in effective strategies of inquiry they generally are .. To motivate this 
arguments that association with focus is bounded, i.e. sensitive to islands; I don1t yet see how to cope with 
the problem this raises in defining the focus alternative set, but it doesn't seem that, e.g., Rooth or van 
Stechow have taken this type of data into account either. 
21 We might want to require that the replacement variables be novel in the sense of Heim (1982), and 
constrain the set of assignment functions to include only those in the Satisfaction Set of the File/Context at 
the time of utterance of f3. This would guarantee that any definite (or Familiar) NPs in Pwould be 
appropriately bound. But I won't pursue this refinement here. 
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on empirical grounds, consider the multiple wh-question (27a) and the simple wh­
question (27b): 
(27) a. Who invited who? 
b. Who did MaryP invite? 
Note that (27b) can be asked more or less immediately following (27a), so that 
<(27a),{(27b),~)> seems to be a felicitous strategy of inquiry. It seems that the prosody 
in (27b) is crucial to this felicity; e.g., the same string but with.focus on invite instead 
would be infelicitous. In order to capture this, we need to say something about the 
presuppositions of prosodic focus in questions. 
It would be desirable to generalize over the presuppositions of prosodic focus for the two 
types of speech act considered, as in (28) below. Assume that each utterance has a 
logical form which involves a mood operator. */3 is e utterance of /3 with mood variable 
* ranging over [? (interrogative),. (assertional)): 
(28) Presupposition of prosodic focus in an utterance *~: 
~ is congruent to the question under discussion at the time of utterance. 
(28) entails the subgeneralization in (26). However, given the definition of congruence in 
(25) and, especially, the definition of the focus alternative set in (24), (28) would fail to 
explain the felicity of <(27a),(27b)>, since in (27b) the wh-word, who is not prosodically 
focused (compare the echo question WHO did Mary invite?, where who i.s plainly 
focused). However, t.he generalization will hold if we change (24) to obtain the set 
ranging not only over the F-marked constituents in /3 but over any wh-elements as well. 
Then we would obtain (29): 22 
(29) Focus alternative sets (Revised definition) 
The focus alternative set corresponding to a constituent ~. 11~11, is the set of all 
interpretations obtained by replacing all the F-marked (focused) and wh­
constituents in ~ with variables, and then interpreting the result relative to each 
member of the set of all assignment functions which vary at most in the values 
they assign to those variables. 
Now we will apply the analysis in (25), (29) and (28) to the analysis of the sequence of 
utterances in (27). Given the semantics for questions in § 1.2, the relevant interpretations 
are those in (27a') and (27b'): 
(27a') l?Who invited whol = {u invited u': u,u' E D) 
So if D = {Mary, Alice,Grace): then the question will have the following q-alternative set 
(ignoring again the possibility of collective arguments): 
{Mary invited Alice, Mary invited Grace, Alice invited Grace, Alice invited Ma,y, 
Grace invited Mary, Grace invited Alice ) 
(27b') (in the same model, given the derivation of this example in (6)) 
l?Who did MaryP invitel = 
{Mary invited Alice, Mary invited Grace ) 
22This would not give the correct results for utterances containing indirect questions. 
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Clearly, the Q-alternative set of Who did MaryF invite? is a subset of that for Who 
invited who?. Hence, (27a) entails (27b), since a complete answer to (27a) will yield a 
valuation for all the alternatives in (27b) as well. (27b) is a sub-question of (27a), so that 
(27) represents a felicitous strategy of inquiry. 
Calculating the focal presuppositions of (27b) as in (29), we find that 11(27b)II = [u invited 
u' I u, u' e DJ. But this is just the set of propositions which is the Q-alternative set of 
(27a); i.e. 11(27b)II = Q-alt(27a) = {u invited u' I u, u' e DJ. Hence (28) is satisfied. 
Note that with broad focus on (27a), the question which it is congruent to is trivial: 1t 1s 
just the Big Question. However, I think' this is misleading in this example: usually invite 
takes not only an agent and a patient, but also a goal, the event to which the patient is 
invited. Since no goal is given in (27a), it strikes me as elliptic, and this ellipsis suggests 
a connection between this question and an on-going prior discussion of some event. I 
won't go into this in any further detail here, but just· want to note that ellipsis, like de­
stressing/de-accenting within a focused constituent, may influence the determination of 
the question to which an utterance, either question or assertion, is presupposed to be 
congruent. See Rooth 0.995) for discussion of the relationship between ellipsis and 
"anaphoric destressing". 
(28) not only explains the felicity of the discourses in <(5a),(5b)> and <(27a),(27b)>, but 
also the infelicity of sequences like those in <(5a),(5c)> and <(5a),(5d)> and in 
<(27a),(27c)> and <(27a),(27d)>, since in none of the lat four cases will the focus 
alternative set of the second element equal the Q-alternative set of the first, the question 
under discussion: 
(5) a. Who did Mary invite? 
b. Mary invited nobodyF. 
c. Mary invitedp nobody. 
d. MaryP invited nobody. 
(27) a. Who invited who? 
b. Who did Maryp invite? 
c. Who did Mary invitep? 
d. Whop did Mary invite? 
Note that on this conception of how prosodic focus works, it triggers a presupposition but 
does not uniquely determine the nature of the set of alternatives with which the utterance 
must be compatible/congruent, following Kadmon & Roberts (1986). Because of 
potential operator scope ambiguities, we also require, in many examples, fairly rich 
information about the structure of the preceding discourse in order to determine what the 
question under discussion actually is, and hence, indirectly, what the truth conditions of 
the utterance itself should be. Consider the example from Kadmon & Roberts, with the 
alternative scopes represented by the possible questions under discussion (QUDs) below 
it:2> 
(30) He doesn't like [MOST)p of the songs. 
most..,: Q-alt(30) = {IDET songs (11,x[-, likes(he,x)))I: IDETI e FJ 
2>Kadmon & Roberts give an analysis of the full prosodic contour of the example, including the pitch 
accents, their placemen!, and the phrase and boundary !ones; this is the same for each of the noted readings. 
They also give a detailed account of the kinds of conlext in which each of these readings can arise. The 
reader is referred lo their paper for details. 
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-, most : Q-alt(30) = {I-, DET songs (AX [likcs(he,x)])I: IDETI E F) 
where DET is a variable of type <<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>>, and Fis the set 
of determiner denotations. 
These sets of alternatives correspond with different questions. For the most -, scope 
order, the question is, roughly, What is the proportion of songs that he doesn't like?; for 
the -, most scope order, the question is What is the proportion of songs that I deny that 
he likes 7. The focus on the utterance makes il in principle congruent with either 
question, and so the utterance is ambiguous in its presupposition. The actual context of 
utterance will generally disambiguate. If it doesn't, i.e., a hearer encounters such an 
utterance without adequate context, then, as discussed by Kadmon & Roberts, the 
simplest context one can evoke will he the default assumption; here, this will be the non­
denial context, in which most has wide scope. Setting up the other possible reading 
involves a more complex context, involving an assertion, its denial and a correction, so 
we are less likely to retrieve it when hearing the utterance out of the blue. 
In summary, the prosodic focus on an utterance gives rise to the presupposition that the 
utterance, whether assertion or question, is congruent lo the question under discussion. 
Such a mechanism will obviously help to give coherence to discourse, and assure 
relevance. And it is at least to some extent redundant: For example, in a 
question/assertion sequence, if the speakers are playing the language game correctly, i.e., 
inter alia observing Relevance and the imperative to address the goal represented by the 
question under discussion, then the assertion should be an answer to the preceding 
question. If the assertion's prosody also presupposes that it plays this role, this is a 
redundant confirmation of the assertion's role, and hence indirectly of the question being 
investigated. But of course, once the rules of a game arc set, we often develop strategies 
for more efficient play. In the case of an assertion, if the prosody presupposes the type of 
question it addresses, then it may not be necessary to actually ask the question explicitly, 
especially if the relevance of the question to the ongoing strategy of inquiry is clear. 
Hence, hearers can use the presuppositions of English prosodic structure to accommodate 
portions of the information structure assumed by the speaker. 
I will now turn to briefly review several types of examples from the literature on focus in 
light of this proposal. 
§2.2 English Focus Phenomena 
In §2.2.1, I will illustrate the application of the theory in §2.1 to one of the most 
discussed phenomena involving focus in English, association with focus. Then in §2.2.2 
I will briefly consider extensions to deal with uses of focus often called contrastive, that 
in contrastive topics, contrastive focused pairs, and yes/no questions interpreted as 
alternatives. 
§2.2.1 Association with Focus as a conversational implicature 24 
Some of the most interesting work in the formal literature on focus in the past decade is 
that which addresses what Jackendoff ( 1972) called association with focus, the tendancy 
for the interpretation of certain operators, including negation, only, even, modals, and 
adverbs of quantification, to depend partly on the prosodic focal structure of the utterance 
24Th~rnks to Niril Kadmon and Paul Portner1 whose thoughtful comments on nn earlier draft led to what is, l 
hope, a considcrnble improvement of this section. They should not, however, be taken to necessarily agree 
with the view proposed here. 
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in which they occur. Rooth (1985) argued that this sensitivity to focus is part of the 
lexical semantics of the operator~ he considered, and that it bears on the determination of 
their domain restriction. Basically, he argued that the domain is (a subset of) the focus­
determined alternative set corresponding to the constituent which is the operator's scope 
at LF, this being specified as part of the lexical meaning of an operator like only. More 
recently, von Stechow (1989) and Krifka (1992, inter alia) have adopted a similar 
approach within the structured propositions framework. In their work, a structured 
meaning reflects the focal structure of the relevant utterance; it is an ordered pair, 
dividing the utterance's meaning into focus and ground. The lexical semantics of one of 
the focus-sensitive operators makes reference to both aspects of the structured meaning of 
the constituent which is its scope. Both of these approaches involving focus-sensitive 
operators place a heavy burden on focus in the architecture of the resulting semantic 
theory; association with focus is taken, by itself, to motivate a significant complication of 
the semantics for a language (see Rooth ( 1996) for some relevant discussion). Further, it 
is clear that focus doesn't fully determine the domain of these operators; other contextual 
factors plus presuppositions of the constituent in the operator's scope also play important 
roles in its determination (see Roberts 1991/1995). It would seem desirable to say 
something about the relationship between these various ways in which the domain is 
determined, but the focus-sensitive approach, being basically semantic, cannot generalize 
to include both the semantic focus-sensitivity and the clearly pragmatic factors. Simply 
making focus sensitivity part of the lexical semantics for the relevant 'operators fails to 
capture what it is that makes. this phenomenon so pervasive in domain restriction. But it 
also seems plain that focus plays a regular and significant role in the interpretation of 
utterances containing these operators. We need to account for this role, something which, 
e.g., Vallduvf (1992, 1993) and Vallduvf & Zacharski (1994) cannot do in a systematic 
way. 
Recently, Rooth (1992), von Fintel ( 1994, I 995), and Schwarzschild ( I 994a,l 994b) have 
attempted more pragmatic accounts of the various association with focus phenomena, 
accounts which are either anaphoric, as in Rooth and von Fintel's work, or involve 
entailments from principles for the interpretation of focus as contrast, as in 
Schwarzschild. The information structure framework presented here suggests another 
kind of pragmatic account 'for association with focus effects, one which follows 
straightforwardly from independently motivated principles defined in previous sections 
of this paper, without necessitating any additional stipulations. The account is like the 
earlier account in Rooth (1985) in assuming that association with focus is essentially a 
fact about how domain restriction of operators is influenced by prosodic focus. But I 
assume no special lexical sensitivity of the relevant operators; and unlike van Stechow 
and Krifka, I would argue that the focal structure of an utterance is transparently given by 
its prosodic structure, without the need to specify an independent partition on its 
meaning. In this section, I will outline how the information structure framework from § I 
and the assumptions about prosodic focus in the previous section explain the role of 
prosodic focus in restricting the domain of only, See Calcagno (1996) for a related view 
of domain restriction in adverbs of quantification. 
Utterance of a construction where only is a VP modifier, x only VPs, is often taken by 
theorists to presuppose that x VPs, but is sometimes assumed to only entail it. I will 
assume the presuppositional view, but this doesn't make a difference to the account I will 
offer. If x VPs is presupposed, then just as prosodic focus, in presupposing a question 
under discussion, can actually be used to introduce that question, so only can be used to 
introduce the presupposition that x VP s, even when it isn't already known to the 
interlocutors. The two cases are parallel in that the presupposition in each is quite 
explicit, so that it is clear what must be accommodated in order to repair the context. 
Unless they have grounds to object, cooperative interlocutors will accommodate these 
presuppositions as necessary. 
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Assume that the meaning of VP-adjunct only is as in (31 ): 
(31) Interpretation of VP-adjunct only : 
Presupposed content: the subject has the property denoted by the VP 
Proffered content: the subject has no properties apart from that denoted by the VP 
Given this, the analysis of Association with Focus, following Rooth, .involves 
determining which class of properties is the intended domain of quantification for the 
operator 110 in the proffered content of only. In Roberts (1991/1995) I argued that this 
couldn't be determined solely on the basis of an algorithm based on prosodic focus, but 
that it should be the set of properties which are relevant in the context at that point in the 
discourse. Now we can be more precise about what that means. The answer will be seen 
to follow from the requirement of Relevance as defined in ( 15) and the presupposition of 
prosodic focus in (28), both repeated here: 
(15) A move m is Relevant to the question under discussion q, i.e. to last(QUD(m)), 
iff m either introduces a partial answer to q (m is an assertion) or is part of a 
strategy to answer q (m is a question). 
(25) Move p is congruent to a question ?a iff its focal alternatives II pu are ihe Q­
alternatives determined by ?a, i.e. iff II pu = Q-alt(a). 
(28) Presupposition of prosodic focus in an utterance *p: 
p is congruent to the question under discussion at the time of utterance. 
To see how this domain restriction works, consider the example in (32): 
(32) Mary only invited [LYN]p for dinner. 
Given (28), (32) presupposes the question in (33): 
(33) Which individual(s) is/are such that Mary has no properties apart from having 
invited that/those individual(s) for dinner? · 
In order to understand what a speaker intends by uttering (32), we must determine the 
intended domain for only. We already know that there is an independent requirement that 
the utterance, and the question it presupposes, be Relevant to the prior context, i.e. that 
they address the question under discussion. If (32) is uttered out of the blue, this would 
mean that the presupposed question (33) would have to form part of a strategy to answer 
the Big Question; all of Mary's properties would be Relevant in such. a case, as any 
information about her having or not having them would address the Big Question. But, 
under the assumption that Mary exists, utterance of (32) out of the blue would make it 
false in any reasonable model, since Mary surely has, at the very least, the property, of 
self-identity (and presumably a number of others), as well as perhaps that of having 
invited Lyn for dinner. Hence, on the assumption that the speaker of (32) is competent 
and is observing the Gricean maxim of Quality, i.e. trying to assert something truthful, 
this can't be the intended context of utterance for (32). As I have argued elsewhere 
(Roberts 1991/1995, 1995b), domain restriction is always constrained by cooperativity: 
the cooperative hearer assumes that the speaker is cooperative as well (and competent), 
and on this basis, seeks to resolve any apparent failure of cooperativity, e.g. failure to 
satisfy the Gricean maxims of Quality or Relevance, presupposition failure, etc., by 
restricting the domain in such a way as to make the contribution cooperative after all. 
Now imagine instead that (32) is uttered following (34): 
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(34) Who did Mary invite for dinner? 
(32) Mary only invited [L YN)p for dinner. 
Of course, as we have already seen, (32) prosodically presupposes that the question under 
discussion is (33), which is not the same question as the explicit (34). We can only 
felicitously accommodate the presupposed (33) if the newly accommodated question is 
itself Relevant to the accepted question (34 ), so that they fonn a felicitous Strategy of 
Inquiry and hence the resulting Infonnation Structure is well-formed. This requirement 
is straightforwardly met just in case we assume that the intended domain of only is (a. 
possibly non-proper subset of) the set of properties which Rooth's ( 1985)/von 
Stechow's/Krifka's theories would fix conventionally as the domain of only in (32). This 
is_ because, given the semantics of questions, only with this domain restriction· will all of 
the answi;rs to (33) be answers to (34) as well, so that (33) is Relevant-to (34). Here's 
why:· 
The only way _to address (34) is to detennine the truth of a proposition of the fonn ~n 
invited al, where a is either a rigid designator denoting an individual in the model or 
else nobody.25 But then this means that the set of Relevant properties is just the set 
which, when predicated of Mary, yields one of those propositions, i.e. a prciperty of the 
fonn !invited al, where a _is either a rigid designator denoting an individual in the model_ . 
or else nobody.. This set of properties is then_ the set which must restrict the domain of 
only in (33) if it is to be Relevant to (34), i.e., to form part of a strategy of inquiry for 
addressing (34). But this is just the set of alternative properties which is retrieved in 
other accounts, e.g. in Rooth (1985} via the calculation of the p-set of.the VP in (32). In 
those accounts, that p-set is referred to by the lexical semantics of only. But on. the 
present account, this isn't necessary. 
When we take the domain of only (the set of relevant properties) in (32) to be the set of 
,properties of inviting someone or other to dinner, then (33) is logically equivalent to (35): 
(35) Which individual(s) x is/are such that of all the properties of inviting someone or 
other for dinner, Mary has none apart from having invited x for dinner? 
Which individual(s) is/are such that Mary invited no one else for dinner? 
(34) and (35) are very close in meaning, though they are not identical: Their q-alternative 
sets are distinct. The difference is also reflected in the fact that all of the direct answers 
to (35) are complete, each of them also a complete answer to (34); if we answer (35) with 
Alice and Gertrude, then this entails that no one else was invited, including Grace. But 
(34) has partial direct answers which are not complete, so that we can answer it with 
Alice and Gertrude without precluding Mary's also having invited Grace. However, 
though these two.utterances don't denote the same question, in any given model all the 
complete answers to (35) are complete answers to (34) and vice versa, so that they 
logically entail each other in the sense defined by Groenendijk & Stokhof.26 Because 
2SAgain, I'm ignoring the possibility that Mary invited more than one individual, which would make 
relevant as partial answers propositions like !Mary invitetf few of the students! . This is merely in the 
interest of simplicity, and is inessential to the argument I give. 
26Recall that questions and answers are semantic entities, not to be confused with the uuerances which 
denote them. If the complete answer to (34) is that suggested by replying noone, this entails that the 
answer to (35) must be that denoted by the reply everyone if there are people in the model, or by nobody if 
there are no people; the converse entailments hold, as well. The complete answer to (34) denoted by 
everyo11e is similarly correlated with the complete answer to (35) given by replying all the people. In the 
less extreme cases, complete answers to the two questions could he expressed identically, so that answering 
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they have the same set of complete answers, (35) and (34} would establish the same 
partition on the context set at a given time of utterance. So with the domain fixed as in 
(35), the presupposed question (33) is Relevant to (34), in the technical sense defined in 
( 15}. But then in order to be Relevant to (33)/(35), and hence indirectly to (34), the 
domain of only in (32) must be set in the same fashion. 
As Paul Portner pointed out (p.c.), this won't guarantee that the domain isn't a pr!Jper 
subset of Rooth'~ properties. But, of course, Rooth also admitted the possibility of 
additional, contextually given restrictions on the domain of only as given by his 
conventional calculation of p-sets and focus-sensitive lexical semantics for only. This 
can be motivated for discourses such as <(34},(32)>. Consider a scenario where the 
interlocutors already know that Mary invited a visiting colleague to dinner and wanted·to 
get someone else in her department to accompany them. Then the alternative set of 
properties should involve all the other people in her department, including Lyn, but not 
the visitor. Then utterance of (32} in that context would not entail that Mary invited no 
one else in the world except Lyn to dinner, and would be consistent with the speaker 
being invited as well. 
But what other kinds of questions might (32) Relevantly address? It turns out that this 
class is quite restricted and depends in part on context. The prosodically presupposed 
question (33} sets up a partition on the context set; the cells, possible complete answers to 
the question, differ from each other in the identity of the sole invitee. Besides the 
relevant properties considered above, corresponding to Rooth's p-set for the VP, any 
other properties that Mary might have are one of two types, which I will call the 
contextually entC1iled restrictions and the logically i11depe11dent properties. The entailed 
restrictions are entailed by the context set, because they are known by the interlocutors to 
be Mary's properties; these include the property of inviting the visitor in the described 
context. Entailed restrictions serve to implicitly restrict the domain of only in a negative 
fashion, because there is no world in the context set in which Mary does not have all 
these properties; so we have the implicit commitative restriction with the visitor on the 
VPs in (32) in the situation described. But an entailed restriction is never Relevant 
because it doesn't distinguish between cells in the partition established by (34}. 
The other type of non-p-set properties are those which so far as the interlocutors know 
may or may not hold of Mary, and hence are in principle completely independent of the 
question under discussion. For example, if (32) is uttered following a question like Did 
Mary brush her teeth this morning?, it will be irRelevant to that question in most 
contexts. That having dinner with someone is not usually Relevant to the question of 
whether she brushed her teeth is reflected in the fact that in any reasonably realistic 
model, the question of whether Mary has the logically independent tooth-brushing 
property establishes a distinct partition from that established by (34). Questions based on 
such independent properties do not bear on the choice of a (partial), answer to the 
question under discussion (33) because they cross-cut the cells in the partition it has 
established; determining that Mary has one of them will hence not lead to removal of a 
cell from the partition. The discourse would fail on those grounds alone, never mind that 
the domain of only in such a context would be as in the case of utterance out of the blue. 
But now suppose ·that the context entails that Mary was going to have dinner with one or 
more of her friends. Further, assume that Mary's friend Lyn is also her dentist and always 
nags her to watch her dental hygiene, but only when the two are alone. Finally, suppose 
that Lyn's reminders to Mary are generally effective so that if, out of the group of her 
friends, Mary only dined with Lyn, then (Lyn having nagged her) she would remember to 
brush her teeth the next morning. In such a case, the question presupposed by (32), (33), 
under the entailed restriction that the only people she was considering dining with were 
(34) by Alice, Gertrude and Grace would entail and be entailed by die answer denoted by the same reply 
to (33), and so forth. 
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the aforementioned group of friends, WOULD be part of a reasonable strategy to answer 
the question of whether she brushed her teeth, for (32) would contextually entail the 
answer to that question. Relevance is essentially context-dependent. But still, (32) could 
only entail the answer to Did Mary brush her teeth? on the assumption that the correct 
domain, i.e. the contextually salient group of her friends, was chosen to restrict the 
interpretation of no in the interpretation of only. So the logically independent properties 
may sometimes be Relevant, but this is entirely dependent on context. 
Rooth's (1985) theory of association with focus, and the subsequent theories of von 
Stechow ( 1989) and Krifka ( 1992) stipulated, as part of the lexical meaning of only, that 
its domain should be calculated directly on the basis of the prosodic focus in its scope. 
There is a type of context in which such theories systematically make the wrong 
predictions, as has been pointed out by Vallduvf (1992), Roberts (1991/1995), and Partee 
( 199 l ). In the present theory, I take their examples to illustrate how prosody, though it 
makes a regular, conventional (because presuppositional) contribution to the 
determination of intended context, and hence of intended domain restriction, cannot by 
itself give the intended domain restriction for only . Nirit Kadmon (p.c.) offers the 
following illustration of this for the example in (32). Suppose we are talking about some 
things that we had been afraid that Mary was going to do today that we disapprove of. 
These included Mary's having the properties listed in (36): 
(36) inviting Lyn for dinner 
inviting Bill for dinner 
staining the tablecloth at lunch 
smoking before dinner 
In this context, consider (37): 
(37) A: Mary wasn't so bad after all. Of all the things we were afraid she might do, 
she only [invited Bill for dinner]F. 
B: You got the person wrong. She only invited [Lyn]F for dinner. But it's true 
that she did only one of those terrible things she could have done. 
In this case, we want the domain of only to be the set of properties in (36), and not the 
set of properties of inviting someone or other for dinner, which latter would be the set 
given compositionally by, e.g., Rooth (1985). Conventionally fixing the domain yields 
the wrong truth conditions. 
Here is how we can account for such examples in the framework of Information 
Structure, given the presupposition of prosodic focus in (28). In (37), A presupposes the 
question (38): 
(38) Which property is such that out of all of the properties in (36), Mary had no other 
properties apart from that. 
The domain restriction for only is explicit, and refers to the principal question under 
discussion, i.e. which of the properties in (36) Mary has. Then A asserts that Mary has 
the property of being such that out of all of the Relevant properties in (36) she only has 
the property of having invited Bill for dinner. The question presupposed by the second 
sentence in (37B) is (33), just as it was for (32). But here the Relevant properties will be 
different, since the context to which B's utterance must be Relevant is different. B makes 
it explicit that (s)he is offering a correction to A; even if (s)he hadn't, in order to explain 
the Relevance of B to (38), the question addressed by the immediately preceding 
utterance A, especially given their parallel forms but contrasting prosodic focus, we 
would assume that B is offering a correction of the assertion made by A. As in 
corrections generally, the corrector B addresses a different question than that addressed 
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by the corrected interlocutor A, as we see by the distinct prosodic pattern employed in A; 
but still the correcting utterance B, by virtue of what it is to correct, gives de facto a 
distinct alternative answer to the question addressed by the corrected A. The questions 
addressed by corrective utterances are meta-questions. Here, (33) is logically equivalent 
to: · 
(39) Which individual(s) is/are such that of all of the properties in (36), Mary has none 
apart from having invited that/those individual(s) for dinner? 
Of course, this is not the same question as (35). The correcting B asserts that it is Lyn 
who is the individual such that of all the Relevant properties in (36), Mary only has the 
property of inviting that person for dinner. This is the correct interpretation, and in fact 
also gives a complete answer to the question A addressed, (38), so that it is also 
contextually Relevant. 
For similar examples, Partee claimed that there were embedded foci with no prosodic 
reflexes; the present account seems to improve on hers by avoiding the assumption of 
abstract foci, with no surface reflexes. Vall du vf took similar examples to discredit 
Rooth's general approach, but offered no general explanation for the Association with 
Focus effects. In the present framework, the contribution of focus IS conventional, albeit 
presuppositional instead of being proffered as in Rooth, and so we can both account for 
the classic examples of Association with Focus and allow for examples like (37). 
Another of the virtues of the present account that it can explain association with focus 
effects in questions, as well as in assertions. So consider (40) and (41): 
(40) Did Mary only invite [Lyn]F? 
(41) [Did Mary only invite Lyn]F? 
By (28), (40) is presupposed to address the question (42): 
(42) Who did Mary oniy invite? 
What (42) means can only be given in view of the context of utterance for (40), i.e. the 
QUD stack and the strategy which it (partially) embodies. One possibility is that it is the 
same as the question (35) discussed above. In that case, in order to be Relevant, and 
hence address (42)/(35), (40) must be part of a strategy to answer (35). But we have seen 
that (35) establishes a partition in which only certain of Mary's properties are Relevant. 
In order to form part of a strategy to address (35), answering (40) must entail at least a 
partial answer to (35), and hence pertain to which of the Relevant properties Mary has. 
This yields the correct domain restriction on only in (40), as it did for (32). (41) has 
broad focus, and so presupposes only the Big Question, which its own answer, of course, 
will be part of a strategy to answer. But the Big Question doesn't give us any clues about 
the domain restriction of only. Here, only additional contextual factors can help, which 
seems appropriate. As we saw in the previous example, prosodic focus doesn't always 
give the intended domain restriction for the relevant operators. 
Finally, notice that on this account the selection of the intended domain of only turns out 
to be purely pragmatic, a conversational implicature: only if the correct domain is 
assumed will the utterance be Relevant.· Assuming that the speaker is cooperative, then, 
we must assume that that domain is intended. It might be objected that this type of 
approach to the problem is too weak to account for the robust facts about association with 
focus. What, for example, of implicature cancellation? Wouldn't this implicative 
account predict that association with focus is cancellable? Though I cannot go into this 
in detail here; let me briefly rebutt this objection: Following Welker (1994), I believe 
that implicature cancellation is generally misunderstood. Given a particular context, 
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conversational implicature cancellation is no more possible than the _cancellation of 
conventional implicatures, i.e. presuppositions. What happens in the classic cases of so­
called implicature cancellation (see, e.g., the papers on implicature in Grice ( 1989) or 
chapter 3 of Levinson (l 983)) is that the speaker clarifies the intended context for the 
utterance, and often, in particular, corrects a misapprehension of the question(s) being 
addressed and/or their role in the strategy of inquiry. So "implicature cancellation" might 
more·aptly be called "post hoc clarification (by the speaker) and revision (by the hearer) 
of intended context". Sometimes this is necessitated by breeches of conversational 
competence, while in other cases the speaker may actually set up the implicature on 
purpose, hastening to pretend it was not intended after the fact to avoid taking 
responsibility for it (a conversational implicature parallel with the gossip case in 
presuppositions). In the present framework, cancellation is not an issue. The theory of 
Information Structure makes it very precise both what a "context" of .utterance is and 
what is required for an utterance to be Relevant in that context, so that the predictions are 
straightforward and unambiguous. "Cancellation" is a species of miscommunication, 
extra-theoretical. 
This illustrates the methodological advantages offered by the type of framework for 
pragmatic analysis proposed here. Though it is common to talk about the context of 
utterance of a given example, this framework, and the prosodic presupposition of 
congruence to a question in particular, force us to look at concrete facets of the 
utterance's context and predict how they directly influence its interpretation. If we 
assume something like InfoStr, in which the roles and relations between questions and 
answers are well-defined, then determining the question under discussion gives us 
information about what is Relevant, puts constraints on logical aspects of interpretation 
like domain restriction, and hence begins to illuminate the hitherto rather mysterious way 
in which context influences interpretation. This permits us to make falsifiable predictions 
about these pragmatic aspects of interpretation (cf. also Kadmon & Roberts 1986), 
legitimating the use of pragmatic explanations as alternatives to the elaboration of the 
semantic architecture of our theories. For Association with Focus, the domain of 
operators like only is pragmatically given, assuming only the independently motivated 
principles in ( 15), (25) and (28). No additional stipulations about lexical semantics need 
be made, structured propositions are not required, and no special anaphoric elements 
associated with focus need be assumed to annotate S-structures. Insofar as Information 
Structure is independently motivated, as a general framework for pragmatic explanation, 
the account carries no additional cost at all. 
§2.2.2 Contrast and Alternatives 
§2.2.2.1 Focal Presuppositions in Utterances with Contrastive Topics 
Jackendoff ( 1972) discussed an interesting phenomenon wherein multiple foci in a single 
utterance may bear two distinct intonation contours, which he called the A and B 
contours. In terms of the analysis of contours of the sort developed by Pierrehumbert and 
her associates, each of Jackendoffs contours appears to involve an entire intonation 
phrase, with a L+H* pitch accent on. the focused sub-constituent, 27 a L- phrase accent, 
and distinct boundary tones: L for A contours, H for B contours. (Native speakers, at 
least, should be able to reconstruct what this sounds like on the basis of the question­
answer pairings below, and their consequences for prosody in the answer.) Jackendoff 
called the focused constituent in the B-contoured phrase the independent focus, that in the 
A-contoured phrase the dependent focus, and showed how the use of these accents 
correlates with certain question/answer pairings. In addition, the B contour is not 
27Sometimes this sounds to me like a simple H* pitch accent, but I follow Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg 
(1990) in assuming L+H*. 
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generally used alone, but assumes the existence of an A contour as we! I. For example, 
consider Jackendoffs (43a) and (43b): 
(43) a. [John]B ate [beans]A 
b. [John]A ate [beans]B 
Along the lines of the analysis of similar examples in Pierrehurnbert & Hirschberg 
( 1990), these examples would be represented as in ( 44): 
(44) a. [JohnFlL-H [ate beansF lL-L 
b. [JohnFlL-L [ate beansF lL-H 
Each of these has two intonation phrases, the bracketed constituents annotated with 
phrase accent/boundary tone sequences, each of which contains a focused constituent (cf. 
the principles of the Phonology of Focus in (22)). In what follows I will sometimes use 
the "A" and "B" accent notations for simplicity, but I assume that something like (44) is 
the more accurate transcription. 
Jackendoff pointed out that (43a) would answer a question like What about John? what 
did he eat?, whereas (43b) would answer a question like What about beans? who ate 
them?. But the question/answer pairings couldn't be switched -- (43a) couldn't answer 
What about beans? who ate them?. I would propose the following account of these 
contours and their distribution within the present framework; the account is based on 
unpublished joint work with Nirit Kadmon (who might not, however, subscribe to the 
present framework within which it is developed). 
Ignoring intonation phrasing, both (43a) and (b) should presuppose that the question 
under discussion is: 
(45) (u ate u': u,u' E DJ, i.e. Who ate what?. 
However, intuitively they aren't direct answers to (45), but respond instead to the distinct 
sub-questions (46a) and (46b): 
(45) Who ate what? 
(46) a. What did [John]r eat? [cf. What about John? what did he eat?] 
(46) b. Who ate [beans Jr? [cf. What about beans? who· ate them?] 
The fact that (43a) and (b) presuppose (45), as well as one of the sub-questions in (46a) 
or (46b), is related to what's going on in the following type of dialogue: 
(47) (No prior discourse, at leas.ton a related subject) 
A: [When are you going to China]r? 
B: Well, I'm going to [China]B in [April] A· 
(47B) answers the question in (47 A), but it does more than that. Its prosodic focal 
structure presupposes that the question under discussion isn't (47A), but the super­
question in (48): 
(48) When are you going to which place?, i.e. {you are going to u at t: u a place, ta 
time) 
It is generally assumed that alternative sets, like operator's domains, are non-singleton, 
non-empty. This question, then, implicates that there is more. than one place that B is 
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planning to visit. Of course, in this context, the super-question hasn't already been 
accepted by A. But A is likely to accommodate it, out of curiosity, and ask (49): 
(49) Oh? Where else are you going, and when? 
i.e. ask for the rest of the information which would complete B's answer to the 
presupposed super-question. In this case, the overall strategy of inquiry is 
<(48),{ <(47A),0>,<(49),0> )>, wherein the superquestion (48) has been accommodated. 
Similarly, the B accents in (43) tell us that the super-question (45) is under discussion and 
that there is also under discussion a sub-question of one of the forms in (46a) or (46b); 
and further that (43a) could only answer (46a), while (43b) could only answer (46b). We 
might say that (43a) presupposes the strategy of inquiry <(45),( <(46a),0> )>, while (43b) 
presupposes the strategy <(45),(<(46b),0>)>. (43a) is an infelicitous move in response 
to the strategy <(45),{ <(46b),0> )>, while (43b) is infelicitous in response to 
<(45),( <(46a),©> )>. Of course, the sub-questions don't have to be explicitly asked, any 
more than (45) does, but that isn't an issue, given the semantic character of the 
presupposed questions in this theory and the abstract nature of the information structure 
of discourse. The goals and assumptions presupposed by the examples in (43) appear to 
be correctly captured by these correlated strategies. 
In order to capture these facts, I assume that both A and B accented noun phrases are 
foci, so that the question in (45) is presupposed; this will follow from the F-marking on 
the utterances in (43). 28 Then how is the assumption of the immediate sub-questions in 
(45) triggered? The crucial difference between the two accents in such examples appears 
to be the boundary tone, H (or the sequence L-H, should it turn out that in general that 
phrase+boundary tones form a morphological unit). The (L-)H accent on the B­
contoured intonation phrase marks its focused constituent as the independent argument to 
the abstract corresponding to (45), i.e. the one chosen first, whose choice then 
determines, or at least narrows, the choice of an alternative from the set corresponding to 
the other, A focus (hence, Jackendoffs term dependent focus ). (L-)H means "answer 
still in progress -- another focus to fill", which explains why it cannot occur by itself (but 
can iterate, so long as there's an A focus around somewhere). If you choose this 
independent argument from one of the alternative sets associated with the question in 
(45), then the presupposed question under discussion will be either (50a) or (50b), i.e.: 
(SO) a. { u likes u': u, u' E D & u = John). 
b. {u likes u': u, u' E D & u' = beans). 
But (50a) is equivalent to (Sla), which is the interpretation of (45a), and (50b) is 
equivalent to (51 b), which is the interpretation of (45b): 
(SI) a. {j likes u': u' E D,j = !John I). 
b. {u likes beans: u E D}. 
So, (43a) and (43b) both presuppose (45) by virtue of identical placement of prosodic 
focus. But the location of a L-H boundary sequence indicates a sequence of selection 
from the contrast sets for the foci, and hence presupposes a sub-question to the 
prosodically presupposed question. Because this boundary sequence is located 
differently in (43a) and (43b), they presuppose distinct sub-questions. The fact that for 
(43a), the presupposed questions (45) and (46a) form a question/sub-question strategy, 
28Vallduvf doesn't assume that contrastive topics, among which I take him to include B-accented elements 
in examples like Jackendoffs, are foci. But so far as I can see, this leaves him without an explanation for 
facts of the sort discussed here. 
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means that (43a) itself presupposes such a strategy; similarly for (43b) and the strategy 
<(45),{ <(46b),¢> }>. Hence, on this account utterances which contain both independent 
and dependent foci presuppose not just a question under discussion. but a possibly 
complex strategy of questions. 
We would of course need to look at more data on the occu1Tence of the L-H boundary 
sequence to see if this is a plausible account for its effects across the bomcl. Hence at 
present, this can only be a provisional proposal for the treatment of examrles like those in 
(43). But note that the boundary tone sequence on B-accented phrases isn't that of 
question intonation, which involves a H-H phrase+boundary tone sequence. In the other 
types of examples involving L-H which I've reviewed informally, its proposed 
contribution to meaning is at least consistent with its apparent role here. 
Note that in these accommodationally enriched discourses, e.g. <(45), (46a), (43a)>, the 
answer, here (43a), is congruent to both the immediate question under discussion, (46a), 
and the super-question, (45). But this does not by itself tell us that the entire strategy 
<(45),{ <(46a),¢> }> is presupposed. Presumably, the latter fact should follow from 
presuppositions associated with the choice of the B accent. This illustrates ho½ the 
presupposition of focus formulated in (28): 
(28) Presupposition of prosodic focus in an utterance "'~: 
~ is congruent to the question under discussion at the time of utterance. 
while necessary, is not yet sufficient to capture all the presuppositions of the prosodic 
structure of an English sentence. To give a fully adequate account. we would need to 
look not only at the selection of focused constituents, but also at both the inionation 
phrasing and the types of phrase accents and boundary tones as,ociated with the chosen 
intonation phrases (and most likely at the particular pitch accents chosen, as well). The 
complexity and richness of prosodic structure is too often overlooked in 
semantic/pragmatic studies of focus, and this sometimes leads to crucial lll!S-analyses of 
certain types of examples. We will see one of these in the following section. 
§2.2.2.2. Contrastive Focus within an Utterance 
There a a number of types of examples of what has often been called contrasti1·e focus 
which seem to follow fairly straightforwardly from the framework and princirles 
proposed here. I'll consider first examples that involve inter-sentential (ur inter-clausal) 
examples like that in (52): 29 
(52) Mary called Sue a Republican, and then [SHElB insulted [HERJ A· 
Note that there is a B accent on she in the second clause. 
It does not suffice to explain the intended· interpretation of the second clause in (52) to 
simply say that it offers an answer to (53): 
(53) Who insulted who? 
This is because (52) seems to have two additional presuppositions: 
(54) (i) the first clause also reports an insult. and 
29It has been suggested to me that this type of example wa'> f1rs1 noticed by George Lukolt, but I don't 
know where. I'd appreciate any references that readers might poinl inc to. 
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(ii) the insulter and insultee roles are reversed in the second clause relative to 
the first. 
However, I will argue that these presuppositions follow fairly straightforwardly from the 
view of prosodic focus sketched earlier in this section, so that this type of example 
doesn't motivate any extra principles pertaining to the interpretation of specifically 
contrastive focus. 
First, notice that in uttering (52) insulted is "deaccented" (see Ladd 1980). Selkirk 
( 1983) objects to the term deaccenting for the prosodic phenomenon in question, as it 
suggests that the constituent in question was initially accented and then lost its accent. 
Especially when the constituent is a verb, it's not clear that it would "normally" be 
prosodically prominent, let alone receive nuclear stress. But in (52) insulted receives a 
rendering which is noticeably flat when compared to its realization in the utterance of 
Mary insulted Sue after What happened next?, or even in the second dause of (52) when 
the implicature that being called a Republican is insulting is not intended. This type·of 
deaccenting presupposes that the insult relation is already under discussion, as would be 
the case if (53) is the question under discussion. I would maintain that a conjoined 
structure is generally offered as a complex (partial) answer to a ~ingle question; this 
would follow from the theory of information structure in §I, in particular from the 
requirement that any given mqve be Relevant, and hence address the question under 
discussion. 3° The destressing on insulted in the second conjunct of (52) presupposes that 
the question is (53). If the first conjunct is -then to be part of the answer to this question, 
it must report an insult as well, yielding the implication in (54i). 
(54ii) arises because the only way that both (54i) can hold and the pronouns take Mary 
and Sue as their' antecedents and yet the second clause still be informative, is for the 
insulter/insultee roles to be reversed. The B accent on She tells us that not only does the 
clause address (53), but also a sub-question, one of the two questions which would result 
if we replace She by one of the salient women in the context, yielding either Who (of 
Mary and Sue) did Mary insult? or Who (of Mary and Sue) did Sue insult?. But the first 
conjunct has already. told us that Mary insulted Sue, so the only sub-question which can 
be non-redundantly addressed by she insulted her is the second, i.e. Who (of Mary and 
Sue) did Sue insult?. Then the nonreflexive pronominal object must denote Mary, and 
. not Sue. 31 Hence, the presupposed question is contextually restricted ii;i such a way as to 
presuppose the reversal of roles in the answer. No special stipulations about contrast 
between pairs of NPs is required. 
A similar story can be told about examples like Schwarzschild's ( 1994) (55): 
(55) a. John was a victim of suicide(, but) 
b. TilE MOB killed SAM. 
The deaccenting of the verb in (55b) presupposes that it's part of the question under 
discussion. Whether it's conjoined with (55a) or simply follows it, the content of the two 
utterances plus the prosody in (55b) will suggest that both are partial answers to the same 
question, i.e. Who killed who?. Notice the difference between the deaccented predicate in 
(55b) and the realization of the predicate in (55c): 
c_. The mob poisoned Sam. 
lOor course, much more needs ID be said ID support this claim, but here it would take me too far afield. 
This is ultimately a question about the rhetorical roles played by complex cjausal structures. See §3 for 
suggestions about how the theory of information structure may relate to rhetoric. 
l 1We could replace the second conjunct by and th•n SHE insultod HERSELF, so that Sue insults Sue, with 
the same implicature that calling someone a Republican is insulting. 
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For me, when (55c) follows (55a), mob, Sam, and poisoned are all accented. I believe 
that the NPs both have B accents, the verb an A accent, suggesting that the question 
under discussion is How was who killed by whom?. The difference between 
<(55.a),(55b)> and <(55a),(55c)> seems to be that John's having committed suicide in 
(55a) entails his having been killed, albeit by himself, whereas it doesn't entail his having 
been poisoned. Hence, the killing in (55b) is "old" information, whereas the poisoning in 
(55c) is not. 
The principle which Schwarzschild offers to account for such examples follows from the 
theory offered here: 
(56) Contrast constraint (Schwarzschild 1994a) 
If B is uttered in contrast with A, then 
i. A is not identical in meaning to B, 
ii. the meaning of A can be gotten by replacing focussed elements of B with 
elements of the same semantic type, and computing the meaning of the 
resulting expression. 
However, this principle can be shown to follow from the present account plus general 
Gricean principles. The non-identity in meaning, (56i), follows from Grice's Quantity l 
maxim, requiring that one be (as) informative (as possible), and the replacement clause 
(56ii) from the assumption that both the clauses in these examples address the same 
question, plus congruence. 
But there is a type of example involving intraclausal contrast which poses prima facie 
problems for the account proposed here. Consider the following example from Rooth 
(1992): 
(57) An [American]F farmer was talking to a [Canadian]F farmer. .. 
As transcribed by Rooth, (57) is predicted by my account to presuppose a question under 
discussion like (58a) or (b): 
(58) a. What kind of farmer was talking to what kind of farmer? 
b. What kinds of farmers were talking (to each other)? 
But somehow this doesn't seem quite right; those native English-speaking linguists with 
whom I've discussed this generally seem to agree that (59) may be felicitously uttered out 
of the blue: 
(59) An AMERICAN farmer was talking to a CANADIAN farmer. 
(59) is a fairly crude impressionistic transcription, which only notes the primary accented 
elements in the utterance. If Rooth has correctly analyzed (59) as (57), then the theory of 
prosodic focus proposed in this paper makes an incorrect prediction, as well as offering 
no account of the contrast in (59). Since the contrast is intra-clausal, we cannot address 
the contrast by claiming that the contrasted constituents suggest alternative (partial) 
answers to a single question under discussion. 
However, there is reason to question whether (57) is the correct analysis of the 
impressionistically transcribed (59). Recall the phonological principle (22d), repeated 
here: 
127 INFORMATION STRUCTURE IN DISCOURSE 
(22) The Phonology of Focus: 
(a) There is at least one intonation phrase per sentential (or sentential­
fragment) utterance. 
(b) There is at least one focused sub-constituent (possibly non-proper) per 
intonation phrase. This focused constituent is marked with the feature F 
in what follows. 
(c) There is at least one pitch accent per focused constituent, associated with a 
subconstituent. 
(d) Every pitch accent must be associated with material in a focused 
constituent. 
(e) There is one phrase accent (H- or L-) and one boundary tone (Hor L) per 
intonation phrase. 
(f) The string-final pitch accent in the focused constituent is assigned the 
most prominent stress in the intonation phrase (Nuclear Stress Rule). 
This predicts that all the material in (57)/(59) except the two adjectives should be 
deaccented. However, this is only a felicitous prosodic contour for (59) when· it is in fact 
the answer to one of the questions in (58), and not when it is uttered out of the blue. In 
the latter, out of the blue type of context, both the first noun farmer and the verb talking 
are accented, although they do not bear nuclear stress; they do not have the flat, 
deaccented contour. But how can we reflect the sense that American and Canadian are 
the primarily contrasted elements of (59) while avoiding the transcription in (57), and 
hence incorrectly predicting a lack of pitch accents on other elements of the utterance? 
One possibility is reflected in (60) below. In it, intermediate intonational phrases (see 
Beckman & Pierrehumbert (1986)) are marked with'-', full intonation phrases with"; as 
is standard in the ToBI transcription system for English (see Beckman & Ayers 1994 ), 
starred tones are pitch accents (aligned with syntactic constituents), T- (where T is either 
a high or a low tone) is a phrase marker (aligned with an intermediate phrase), and Tis a 
boundary tone (aligned with a full intonational phrase): 
(60) [[An AMERICAN]. [farmer].] [[was talking]. [to a CANADIAN farmer]_] 
H* L- H* L-L H* L- H* L- L 
The existence of two full intonational phrases is indicated by a slight pause and 
lengthening at the end of the first, after farmer, as well as the falling phrase accent and 
boundary tone. In addition, each full intonation phrase involves two intermediate 
phrases, with intermediate phrase boundaries between AMERICAN andfarmer and 
again between talking and to. In this structure, we might claim that the each of the 
intermediate phrases is focused (i.e., each has maximally broad focus). This is consistent 
with the pitch accent placement, which in the first three intermediate phrases falls on the 
final element, i.e. on American.farmer, and talking. Consistent with the informants' 
realization of (59), and unlike the realization of Rooth's (57), the only deaccented element 
in the string is the second token of farmer. This lack of accent may be accounted for by 
the anaphoric deaccenting argued for in detail by Ladd (1980) and Selkirk (1983 ), with 
the antecedent in (59)/(60) being the first token of the noun; hence, the deaccented final 
element is still consistent with assuming that the final intermediate intonation phrase has 
broadest focus. 
(60) would be congruent with the question: 
(61) Who was doing what? 
Unlike the questions in (58), (61) is compatible with the intuition that (59) may be uttered 
out of the blue, if we take the latter to mean that the utterance addresses a very general 
question. 
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·But even if this is correct, what can we say about the placement of primary stress on the 
adjectives? That does plainly seem to be motivated by the intended contrast ·between 
their values. David Dowty (p.c.) pointed out a related type of example, inspired by 
earlier examples due to Horn (I 985, 1989): l2 
(62) A PROactive farmer was talking to a REactive farmer. 
(62) may also be uttered more or less out of the blue; the prosodic facts in such an 
utterance -- lack of deaccenting on the first adjective stem, noun and verb -- parallel those 
for (59). This suggests that the focal structure of (62) is more like that in (60) than that in 
(57). In fact, it doesn't seem that this type of example can be understood to involve 
narrow focus on the contrasted prefixes, insofar as focus is taken to correlate with 
syntactic constituents. What kind of question under discussion could such narrow focus 
indicate?: What kind of-active farmer was talking to what kind of-active farmer?. Since 
the prefix re- in reactive isn't productive in contemporary English, such a narrow focus 
would be not only sub-lexical, but sub-morphological, and this is surely related to the 
infelicity of such a question. Several other pairs of adjectives would work in the same 
way, such as UNinterested and D!Sinterested, so the phenomenon is fairly general. 
It seems that in examples like (62), as in (59) under the analysis in (60), a contrast is 
superimposed on an otherwise broadly focused prosodic structure. With respect to (60), 
note that, whatever physical measure(s) actually correlate with perceived relative stress, 
none of the principles for the phonology of English prosody in (22) bear on the 
comparative value of multiple intonation phrases or intermediate intonation phrases with 
respect to these measures. In fact, of course, we know that final phrases are not always 
stronger in this respect that those earlier in an utterance; witness the sotto voice often 
used for intraclausal parenthetical elements or asides. Hence, what I take (60) to suggest 
is that there is a mechanism for determining relative weight of multiple intermediate 
phrases which goes beyond the rules for intonation phrasing and placement of accent and 
focus, as given in (22). 
Of course, determining whether (60) is, in fact, the correct analysis of the out of the blue 
utterance of (59) would require phonetic analysis which I am not prepared to undertake. I 
do think it obvious that (57) is not the correct analysis, given the way focus placement 
relates to de-accenting, and the implications of the latter. Perhaps the clear moral to be 
drawn is that we must be more careful about what we claim about the focal structure of 
utterances, as there are more matters to be considered than the impression of primary 
stress or contrast In addition, the discussion raises other important questions about the 
pragmatics of prosody, including expecially the function of the intonational phrasing 
which also seems to play a role in conveying the contrast. My suspicion that in examples 
like these the contrast involves a meta-linguistic use of prosody is partly inspired and 
strengthened by the role that focus plays in Horn's metalinguistic negation and in so­
called alternative questions, a phenomenon to which I turn now. 
§2.2.2.3. Yes/No vs. Alternative Questions 
von Stechow notes that the string in (63) is ambiguous between a yes/no question reading 
and an alternative question reading. Though he doesn't discuss prosody, I believe these 
readings correspond to the alternate realizations roughly indicated in (63a) and (63b), 
respectively (I ignore pitch accents here, and give only the phrase accents, foci and 
boundary tones): 
32Horn gives examples combining contrastive focus with metalinguistic negation. He ( 1989:434-35) 
credits Bolinger (1961) and Carlson (1983) with earlier examples oftlrnt type. 
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(63) Do you want coffee or tea? 
a. [Do you want coffee or tea]p? 
H-H 
b. [Do you want [coffee]p] [or [tea]p]? 
H-H L-L 
These should have the interpretations given in (64): 
(64) a. (you want coffeevtea}, where cojj'eevtea is the meet of lco.ffeel and lteal 
b. ( you want u: u e ( coffee,tea J } = { you want coffee.you want tea} 
The interpretation for (63a) in (64a) is arrived at straightforwardly. The simple yes/no 
question will set up a partition on the context set which has only two cells, one containing 
those worlds in which the single proposition in the set (64a) is true, and one containing 
those worlds in which it is false. The issue is how we arrive at the interpretation in (64b). 
Note that this is equivalent to the question denoted by the conjoined Do you want coffee?, 
and do you want tea?. The interpretation of (63) in (64b) thus involves a semantic 
version of conjunction reduction, converting the object language disjunction into 
metalanguage conjunction. von Stechow proposes that or in questions generally behaves 
as set union: At the content level it joins sets of worlds, but at the alternative level it 
joins sets of propositions. In his theory, (64b) is the straightforward reading, while (64a) 
must be explained by some additional mechanism (he basically uses quantifying-in). The 
account says nothing about the correlation between prosody and interpretation. 
I would propose that or ordinarily (even in questions) has the standard Boolean 
interpretation, so that (63a)/(64a) is quite straightforward. But or · sometimes has a 
metalinguistic use, whose function is to indicate contrasting alternatives expressed by the 
independently focused disjuncts. Compare Hom's (1985,1989) metalinguistic negation, 
which is also generally accompanied by narrow focus on the corrected or cancelled 
constituent. Hom argues ()989:379ff) that other operators, including or, also have 
metalinguistic interpretations, and offers examples like (65): 
(65) Is the conductor Bernst(fY]n or Bemst[aY]n? 
This is a question about the pronunciation of the conductor's name, and hence is clearly 
metalinguistic. 
I woul9 argue that in its metalinguistic use, or functions as suggested by von Stechow, 
yielding the union of the alternatives given by the disjuncts, which set then gives 
alternative values for a single focused argument in the utterance in question. Hence, 
(63b) presupposes that the question under discussion is What do you want?, {you want u: 
u e DJ. The particular alternatives provided suggest the natural class which we take to 
restrict D, so that it must include at least coffee and tea. The default final 
phrase/boundary tone sequence in (63b) is L-L, which suggests finality, i.e. that the 
alternatives given are the full set. Thus we arrive at the question {you want u: u e D and 
u e {coffee,tea) ), This is the set of propositions want(you,coffee) and want(you,tea) in 
(64b), as desired, equivalent to asking two, conjoined yes/no questions. (I take it that the 
exclusive sense of the disjunction arises from a conversational implicature, an assumption 
which is now fairly standard in the literature.) A final H-H sequence is also possible (like 
the H-H generally present at the end of the intonation phrase including coffee ), which 
would suggest that there may be other beverages available as we(J.33 Using 
33That is, 1he alternative question (58b) may also be asked with the focal slructure in (i): 
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metalinguistic disjunction, the desired result is obtained without conjunction reduction, 
and (63a) is not more complicated than it ought to be. 
This view of how metalinguistic disjunction works also appears to be extendable to 
explain examples like Horn's (65). We do ask questions like ls the conductor 
Bemst[D'Jn?, meaning 'is his name pronounced like this?', and the present view would 
make (65) denote a conjunction of two such questions. This is comforting, but of course 
it doesn't mean that what I have suggested here constitutes a theory of the phenomenon in 
question. I have only argued that these phenomena are compatible with the theory of 
prosodic presuppositions outlined in this section. 
§3. Further Applications of the Theory of Information Structure 
The theory sketched in §§ I and 2 seems to capture what's essential about the type of 
alternative semantics promoted by Rooth ( 1992), but without any special anaphoric 
mechanism or focus-sensitivity. And it also promises to lead to a general, 
presuppositional theory of domain restriction for operators in natural language, along 
lines sketched in Calcagno ( 1996), von Fin tel ( 1995), Roberts ( 1991/95), and Rooth 
( 1992). But I think that it potentially has much broader applications. Here I will briefly 
outline some of the connections I see between this theory and other work in the pragmatic 
literature (from various fields) on a variety of issues. The thread that connects them is 
the notion of a plan or intention. Probably not everyone whose work I mention here 
would be comfortable with translating those notions into that of the goal, or question 
under discussion in a discourse, with the information structure in which that goal plays a 
part reflected in the common ground. However, if we are willing to do so, information 
structure turns out to be a central facet of pragmatic theory, unifying a number of 
apparently disparate issues and opening up some intriguing possibilities. The central 
claim is that the analysis of all these various pragmatic phenomena requires a richer 
notion of context than that generally given, one of the sort sketched in §I. Then many of 
the pragmatic phenomena in question can be seen as presuppositions about the structure 
of the context of utterance, its information structure, while others involve the generation 
of inferences which are partly triggered by constraints on how an utterance fits into that 
information structure. The task of analyzing those presuppositions or determining how 
those inferences are drawn is considerably lightened when we have a clearer notion of the 
organization of the flow of information in discourse. 
Thomason ( I990) argues thqt the common ground, plans (as developed in Planning 
Theory in artificial intelligence), and accommodation should be central components of a 
theory of pragmatics. He sketches how the interlocutors' discourse plans, information in 
the common ground, and plan inferencing, play a crucial role in the calculation of the 
Gricean conversational implicatures intended by speakers; this is quite in· keeping with 
Grice's own consistent relativization of implicature (and in fact, of non-natural meaning 
itself) to the speaker's intentions. 34 Further, both plans and conversational implicatures 
are accommodated to the common ground. In a sense, the present proposal can be seen 
(i) Do you want [ coffee JF or [tea]p'? 
H-H% H-H% 
(ii) [Do you want coffee]p or [tea]p'? 
H-H% H-H% 
Like'(57b), the prosody in (i) seems to implicate that the hearer docs want something; this is due to the i'act 
that it is presupposed to be part of a strategy to answer the question What do you wa11t'. (ii) also denotes 
(58b), but it doesn't presuppose such a super-question. Both (i) and (ii) clearly ask two yes/no questions, 
each marked by the H- phrnse accent and H% boundary tone. All of this, of course, requires further 
investigation. See Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg (1990:302ff) for relevant discussion. 
341 believe that Thomason's student McCafferty ( 1987) takes a similar approach to conversational 
implicature, though I'm not directly .familiar with his work. 
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as an extension of Thomason's vision of a pragmatic theory, using semantic questions and 
strategies of inquiry to capture the notions of goal and plan. As Sperber & Wilson 
( 1986) argue in detail, one problem with the Gricean approach to date has been the 
vagueness in his definitions of the conversational maxims, and hence the indeterminacy 
about their applicability. Besides Relevance, Grice defined both maxims of Quantity 
relative to the "purposes of the conversation". It doesn't seem unreasonable to hope that 
their senses, as well as the often-cited problem of determining how to balance their 
conflicting requirements, might also be clarified through exploring their role in a 
framework based on InfoStr. Welker (1994) takes up the basic idea sketched in 
Thomason and develops a theory of plans in the common ground, in which 
conversational implicatures are generated by applying plan inference rules to contextual 
information (including already available information about the interlocutors' plans) plus 
the content of the utterance itself. Then, like other contextual entailments, implicatures 
are accommodated to the common ground. Her approach explores several types of 
implicature which are generally overlooked in less systematic approaches, as well as 
revealing the close relationship of conversational implicatures to other kinds of 
contextual entailments. In view of the work of Thomason and Welker, I speculate that 
we can use the same structures motivated here for focus in the generation of 
conversational implicatures, characterizing discourse plans in terms of strategies of 
inquiry. Roberts (1996b) is a first sketch of how this would work. 
Some who work in Planning Theory (see Perreault (1990) and references therein) have 
recognized its utility in explaining and motivating the characteristics of various kinds of 
speech acts in discourse, characteristics which are otherwise simply stipulated, claimed to 
be primitive. In these theories, plan inferencing mechanisms may be used to draw 
conclusions about what speech act a speaker intended, even though the speech act type 
need not, contra Searle et al., be part of the conventional content of the utterance. In 
terms of the present theory, this suggests that we can infer speech act information (is that 
a threat or a prof!1ise, an assertion or a warning?) partly from the relationship of an 
utterance to the strategy of inquiry in which it plays a role, and partly from the 
relationship of that strategy of inquiry to the domain plan(s) which it serves. 
There is also a good deal of work on discourse cohesion and discourse segmentation, and 
the role of the latter in anaphora and inference, which I think could be related to the 
perspective developed here. One example is the work of Grosz & Sidner ( l 986) on the 
use of what they call the Intentional Structure of discourse to identify discourse segments, 
which in turn, they claim, play a constraining role on the possibility of anaphora in 
discourse. Sperber & Wilson ( l 986) attempt to reduce Gricean maxims of conversation 
to entailments derived from principles of rational behavior and facts about the limitations 
of human cognitive processing; 35 from the facts about cognitive processing follow 
coherence constraints such as Relevance (which they give a definition quite different 
from that in ( 15) above), while from the principles of rational behavior follow the 
development of rational strategies for achieving one's ends. They also discuss how 
Relevance plays a role in limiting the domains for inferencing in discourse, by restricting 
access to information which, although in the common ground, is not relevant to the issue 
at hand. The latter connection is particularly promising, suggesting that the strategies we 
develop limit the kinds of inferences we're likely to draw from the information we're 
given access to, given the common ground. 
Another desideratum might be to develop a theory of topics and of topicalization 
(syntactic preposing), based on information structure. The discussion in §2.2.2 suggests a 
way of approaching the function of contrastive topics in terms of information structure, 
an approach which appears to be related to that of Biiring ( l 994). However, topics, even 
when topicalized, are not all necessarily contrastive; for example, sometimes they do not 
35Sperber & Wilson also attempt to reduce all the Oricean maxims to the single maxim of Relevance. 
However. I think this aspect of their argument is less successful. 
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bear Jackendoff's B accent (see Ward ( 1985) for lots of examples of topicalized 
constituents which are non-contrastive). Further, topics as defined by most authors aren't 
necessarily all preposed, so that it would seem desirable to give independent, though 
perhaps related, accounts of the functions of topichood and of topicalization. To my 
knowledge, no one has yet proposed a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for either 
topichood or for topicalization, so that it isn't entirely clear what the former notion is, 
what the latter's functional role is, or what their relationship may be. Even worse, I think 
there is reason to be skeptical about whether there is such a universal function as Topic, 
or Vallduvf's ( 1993) Link, or even whether there is a unified pragmatic function of 
topicalization/preposing; apart from contrastive topics, there is no consistent conventional 
indication of topic- or Linkhood in a language like English, and see Culicover & 
Rochemont ( I983) for suggestions that preposing may have multiple functions in 
English. See McNally (1995) for more discussion of the problems in defining what is 
meant by Topic. Focus-preposings would also fall under the theory of focus, but of 
course that wouldn't by itself explain their preposability. One thing which might be 
promising with respect to the utility of the present theory for the development of a theory 
of topics and topicalization is the possibility of explaining the contextual source of the 
salient partially ordered sets (PoSets) that Ward ( 1985) argues are presupposed by 
topicalization (though he doesn't explain why this should be or how these sets are 
contextually introduced in the general case). 36 If topicalized constituents are prosodically 
focused, which a preliminary review suggests that they are, these PoSets would be their 
corresponding alternative sets, and we would expect that they could be retrieved by 
studying the strategy of inquiry and in which these constructions occur and the common 
ground to determine what is Relevant. 
There has been a good deal of interest lately in the use of rhetorical relations to structure 
discourse, following the work of Mann & Thompson ( 1987). I believe that Aristotle (I 
don't know where) claimed that logic was the basis for a science of rhetoric. That would 
be an interesting point of departure in exploring the relationship of rhetorical structures to 
the information structure posited here, with pafticular types of rhetorical relations over 
stretches of discourse characterized as types of strategies. Rhetorical relations can often, 
at least, be characterized in terms of questions and answers: e.g., the use of a why­
question and its answer to characterize explanations, etc. I suspect, however, that these 
relations often serve the goal, or question under discussion in another respect -- the goal 
of discourse is only partly to offer more information, and partly to achieve consensus 
about the value of the information contributed. So some rhetorical structures are intended 
principally to convince one's hearers that the information offered is worth adding to the 
common ground, e.g. by showing how it follows from or explains other known facts, etc. 
Studying these might lead to a more subtle grasp of the nature of information structure, 
and, in particular, of what it means to address a question under discussion. 
Finally, if all these connections can be made, one of the advantages of this approach is 
that we only need to impose one primitive type of structure on the information in 
discourse, other than encyclopedic semantic networks and certain binary distinctions such 
as those between facts and default assumptions, or between explicitly introduced 
information and that which was only implicated, etc.l7 This hope is the basis of the 
subtitle of this paper --Towards cm illtegrated theory offormal pragmatics. If pragmatic 
36This proposal in Ward is closely related to the assumption in Hirschberg ( 1985) that scalar implictllure 
also requires salient P0Se1s, a requirement which should also fall OUI of the present approach, under the 
relation between implicature and prosodic focus noted in Rooth ( 1992). 
:nLouise McNally (p.c.) pointed out lo me that information structure may not subsume the kind of relation 
between kinds of information sometimes referred to as thefigure/gro1111d relation, a rclalion sometimes 
apparently reflected in the use of frame adverbials, in the distinction between conjoined and subordinated 
clauses, etc. Though I suspect that this relationship should also be characterized prcsuppositionally, it may 
be that the kinds of presuppositions involved differ in interesting ways from those associated with prosodic 
focus. 
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explanations are ever to be theoretically reputable, they must be couched in terms of a 
theory of pragmatics which is explicit enough to be defeasible and sufficiently broad in 
scope to have something to say about the relationship between various kinds of 
purportedly pragmatic phenomena. The theory in § I aims at such explicitness, and the 
brief notes in this section are intended to suggest its potential breadth. The proposed 
application to the analysis of focus is intended to suggest how such a theory could take 
some of the burden off of semantic theory, and ultimately I suspect off of syntactic theory 
as well, resulting in a simpler overall theory of interpretation while providing empirically 
superior accounts. Any theories which purport to offer pragmatic explanations should be 
gauged against such overarching desiderata, and not solely on the basis of claims to 
address some particular linguistic phenomenon in isolation. 
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